اصل حق تعیین سرنوشت صرفاً ابزاری برای دستیابی به امتیازات اقتصادی یا سیاسی برای نخبگان نیست

 

در برخی موارد، نخبگان گروه‌های اقلیت برای کسب نفوذ و قدرت، از اصل حق تعیین سرنوشت ملی به عنوان ابزاری برای بسیج مردم علیه دولت مرکزی استفاده می‌کنند. در این زمینه، ادعاهای مربوط به حق تعیین سرنوشت در درجه‌ی نخست وسیله‌ای برای کسب امتیازات سیاسی یا اقتصادی از دولت مرکزی محسوب می‌شود.

با مشروعیت یافتن اصل حق تعیین سرنوشت در گفتمان‌های داخلی و بین‌المللی، گروه‌های اقلیت ملی بیش از پیش ترغیب می‌شوند تا برای تضمین منافع خود از دولت‌هایشان، به این اصل استناد کنند. اقلیت‌های ملی قدرتمند، به‌ویژه آن‌هایی که دارای سابقه‌ی استقلال یا حمایت نظامی خارجی هستند، نسبت به اقلیت‌های ضعیف‌تر، احتمال بیشتری دارد که خواستار اعمال حق تعیین سرنوشت شوند.

این روند همچنین نشان می‌دهد که ادعاهای مربوط به حق تعیین سرنوشت، اغلب به‌صورت استراتژیک از سوی کسانی مطرح می‌شوند که در موقعیت چالش با دولت قرار دارند. بسیاری از جنگ‌هایی که بر سر حق تعیین سرنوشت در می‌گیرند، نه‌تنها مرگبار بلکه عمیق و ریشه‌دارتر از درگیری‌های طبقاتی، مذهبی یا ایدئولوژیک هستند.

این امر نشان می‌دهد که اصل حق تعیین سرنوشت صرفاً ابزاری برای دستیابی به امتیازات شغلی، اقتصادی یا سیاسی در چارچوب کشور موجود نیست، بلکه هدف نهایی آن، دستیابی به حاکمیت ملی است. با توجه به ماهیت فراگیر این منازعات و نقش فزاینده‌ی حق تعیین سرنوشت در بسیج گروه‌های اقلیت، سیاست‌گذاران و پژوهشگران باید توجه جدی‌تر و عمیق‌تری به این موضوع مبذول دارند.

مهراب سرجوئی

 The death of an independent state:

 People worldwide, almost countless millions, continue to cling to a state as their preferred form of political organisation. We need only recall the powerful attraction of self-determination and political independence based on the state for the people of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East during the demise of European colonialism and for the people of Eastern Europe during the demise of the Soviet empire.

 When states fragment, as in the case of Yugoslavia at the end of the Cold War, the fragments turn out to be new (in the case of Baluchistan's old one). In terms of history, all these main movements toward the sovereign state occurred recently, in the half of the twentieth century.

 Individuals' security, freedom, and prosperity are based primarily on the state and state system. Individual security does not stand on a global political or legal organisation; such an institution does not exist to protect a person's security and rights. 

Where security is dependent on other social organisations, such as family or the clan, as is happening in the Iranian-occupied Baluchistan, that is because the state has failed as an organisation. The Baluch are trying to make the best of a bad situation. Iran has failed the Baluch, but it does not mean that The Baluch have given up on the state system. The Baluch want what the people of many other states already have: a developed and democratic state for themselves. The Baluch does not stand for the revitalisation of the Persian colonial system.

Mehrab Sarjov is a political activist based in the UK, advocates for an independent Balochistan from Iran.

Nationalism, Bureaucratic incorporation

Two main types of ethnic cores are the foundation for creating nations: the lateral and vertical. Exploring the lateral route first, we find that autocratic ethnic groups have the potential for self-perpetuation if they can incorporate other population strata. 

However, many of these lateral ethnic groups fail to do so, leading to the disappearance of their cultures along with the demise of their states. Some lateral ethnic groups survived by developing and preserving a sense of common descent and shared memories. Others incorporate new ethnic and cultural elements into their foundational myths, symbols, and memories, spreading the cultural identity to a broader population. The Castilians provide a successful example of this cultural incorporation and expansion, forming the core of a Spanish state that expelled Muslim rulers and nearly united the Iberian Peninsula. 

However, Franks and Norman's achievements, which proved historically significant, overshadowed Castilian success. In all three cases, lower strata and outlying regions gradually become incorporated into the state, grounded upon a dominant ethnic core. The Castilians achieved this through administrative and financial measures and by rallying parts of the population for inter-state conflict. The upper-class ethnic groups evolved a strong and stable administrative apparatus, which provided cultural regulation and defined a new and broader cultural identity. The upper-class culture set its stamp on the state and the evolving national identity, resulting in varying degrees of accommodation between the upper-class culture and those prevalent among the lower strata and peripheral regions. 

An example of this cultural fusion and social intermingling is evident in the development of the English nation. Following the Norman Conquest, considerable intermarriage, linguistic borrowing, and elite mobility led to a fusion of linguistic culture within a common religious and political framework. There was substantial cultural fusion and social intermingling between Anglo-Saxon, Danish, and Norman elements. 

The Scottish wars helped to bring together different ethnic communities. Although the English nation had not fully formed by the late fourteenth century, there were signs of integration and unity. Economic unity was still developing, and boundaries with Scotland and France remained disputed. A public mass education system and common legal rights were established in England later.

The entire development of these civil elements of nationhood would have to wait for the Industrial Revolution and its effects, especially from the thirteenth century onward. The Anglo-French and Scottish wars further served to unite the disparate ethnic communities. Although the English nation had not fully formed by the late fourteenth century, there were signs of integration and unity. Economic unity was still developing, and boundaries with Scotland and France remained disputed.

Developing these civil aspects of nationhood would require the Industrial Revolution and its effects.

The ethnic elements of the nation were well-developed by the fourteenth century or slightly later. Common names and lineage mythology, initially popularised by Geoffrey of Monmouth, were widely embraced, along with various historical recollections fueled by conflicts in Scotland and France; there was a strong sense of unified culture rooted in language and ecclesiastical structure, fostering solidarity despite internal class divisions and a deep attachment to the island kingdom. The foundations of a unitary state and compact nation were established by a Norman group that integrated the Anglo-Saxon population into its regal administration.

However, the ideology of Englishness did not emerge until the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the old British myth was replaced by a more potent middle-class Saxon mythology of ancient liberties.

A similar process of bureaucratic incorporation by an upper lateral ethnicity can be seen in France. During the Christianized Merovingian dynasty, upper-stratum Frankish culture merged with the native Romano-Gallic culture. 

However, a unified reign only became evident in northern France towards the end of the twelfth century. During this period, ancient myths of Trojan ancestry were revived and applied to the Franks.  

It is a fact that an originally Frankish ruling-class ethnie succeeded, after many challenges, in establishing a relatively efficient and centralised royal administration over north and central France (later southern France). The royal administration facilitated the development of a unified economy and linguistic and legal standardisation within a compact territory, which, from the seventeenth century onwards, catalysed the formation of the French nation as we recognise it.

However, many regions retained their local character even after the French Revolution; the process was not completed until the end of the nineteenth century.

The Third Republic transformed peasants into Frenchmen by applying Jacobin nationalism, mass education, and conscription.

Spain underwent a significant transformation as the Castilian kingdoms resisted Muslim power and subsequently used a religious community to homogenise the kingdom of Aragon.

The expulsion of non-conformists such as Jews and Moriscos, along with the concept of "limpieza de sangre, " contributed to the unity of the Spanish crown. 

Despite the independence of the Portuguese and failed Catalan revolts, Spain remained a polye-thnic state with distinct Basque, Galician, and Andalusian identities. The rise of ideological nationalism in the 19th century led to varying degrees of autonomous development among these ethnic communities. However, they shared an overarching Spanish sentiment and culture. 

England, France, and Spain can be attributed to the development of modern nations due to their military and economic power during the rise of nationalism. England, France, and, to an extent, Spain developed rational bureaucratic administration, merchant capital, urban centres, and professional military forces, laying the foundation for the nation. 

Some argue that the state created the nation by instilling a sense of corporate loyalty and identity in its subjects. While the state was indeed crucial for the formation of national loyalties, its operations were influenced by earlier assumptions about kingdoms and peoples and the presence of core ethnic communities. In England and France, this process of ethnic fusion was possible due to a relatively homogeneous ethnic core, which was essential for the development of homogenising states and the concept of the nation.

The rediscovery of the ethnic past

The process by which common ethnic groups may form the basis for nations is indirectly influenced by the state and its administration, unlike the route of bureaucratic incorporation by lateral ethnicities. It is typically the case because these groups were either subject communities or because, as seen in Byzantium and Russia, the state represented interests that those interests were partially outside its core ethnicity. This distinction also gives rise to intriguing variations in fundamental political myth, or mythomoteur, of vertical ethnicities.

In whole communities, cultural myths and values are passed down from generation to generation and spread across the community territory and social hierarchy. These achievements were made possible through organised religions, which had sacred texts, rituals, clergy, and sometimes secret knowledge. The social aspects of salvation religions, in particular, have helped these cultural traditions persist and have influenced the identities of different ethnic groups. For example, among Orthodox Greeks, Russians, Monophysite Copts, Ethiopians, Gregorian Armenians, Jews, Catholic Irish and Poles, myths, symbols, rituals, and sacred texts have played a crucial role in preserving traditions and strengthening social bonds within the community.

The hold of an ethnic religion posed critical challenges for creating nations from religious communities. People are shaped by religion, and their identity is deeply connected to the symbols and structure of an ancient faith. They often struggle in their attempts to become nations, and their intellectuals may find it hard to move beyond the conceptual framework of a religious-ethnic community.

Many members of such ethnically defined groups assumed that theirs was already and had always been a nation. According to some definitions, they were indeed a nation that possessed all the essential ethnic components of one. For example, Arabs and Jews shared common names, ancestral myths, memories, and religious cultures, ties to an original homeland, and a strong sense of ethnic solidarity when subdivided. Did this not meet the criteria of nationhood?

All they needed was to achieve independence and establish a state for the community.

The transition from ethnie to nation for the Arab and Jewish communities was not straightforward. Apart from geopolitical challenges, internal social and cultural factors made the process difficult. The geographic spread of the Arab nation contradicted the ideal of a compact nation in a defined area. Additionally, the varied histories of different Arab sub-divisions, the impact of modern colonialism, and the influence of Islam on Arab identity created complexity and ambiguity, overshadowing efforts to rediscover an Arab past.

The Jews faced challenges due to their geographic dispersion. as they lacked recognised territory and were exiled from their ancient homeland. While they had some educational and legal opportunities in certain areas, they were restricted in many ways and were forced to occupy specific economic roles in Europe. Additionally, there were conflicting attitudes and self-definitions within Judaism and its rabbinical authorities, which created obstacles to national unity. It was only later that some rabbis and a faction of Orthodoxy began to support Jewish nationalism and the Zionist project, despite traditional hopes for a messianic restoration to Zion. The concept of Jewish self-help had become foreign to the medieval interpretation of Judaism, and the prevailing belief that the Jews were a nation in exile perpetuated a sense of passivity.

Amid declining communities and Western expansion, a new group of secular intellectuals emerged as the populace resigned. Their primary goal, as they understood it, was to change the connection of a religious tradition with its leading followers, the ordinary people. Consider this development in the broader context of a series of socioeconomic, political, and cultural revolutions that started in the early modern period in the West. As mentioned, the main driving force behind these changes was establishing a new professionalised bureaucratic state based on a relatively homogeneous ethnic group.

Attempts by older political groups to adopt some aspects of the Western rational state to make their administrations and armies more efficient disrupted the traditional arrangements of these empires with their diverse ethnic groups. In the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Romanov empires, increased government involvement, growing urbanisation, and trade renewed pressure on various ethnic groups. The spread of nationalist ideas from the late eighteenth century onward brought new ideals of cohesive population groups, representation for the people, and cultural diversity, which influenced the ruling classes of these empires and especially the educated members of their subject communities.

Attempts by older political groups to adopt certain aspects of the Western rational state to make their administrations and armies more efficient disrupted the traditional arrangements of these empires with their diverse ethnic groups.

In the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Romanov empires, increased government involvement and growing urbanisation and trade put renewed pressure on many different ethnic groups. The spread of nationalist ideas from the late eighteenth century onward brought new ideals of cohesive population groups, representation for the people, and cultural diversity, which influenced the ruling classes of these empires, especially the educated members of their subject communities.

Transitioning from passive peripheral minorities to an active, assertive, and politicised community with a unified policy; Striving for recognition of a homeland for the community, with a clearly defined territory; Economic integration of all members within the demarcated territory, with control over its resources, and moving towards economic self-sufficiency in a competitive global context; Granting legal citizenship to ethnic members, mobilise them for political purposes, and bestowing upon them equal civil, social, and political rights and responsibilities; Placing the people at the core of moral and political considerations and promoting the new role of the masses through.

The traditional elites, especially the custodians of sacred texts that have long defined the community, may resist the changes, as expected. It means that intellectuals should present their new ideas using ancient symbols and formats to redefine the community. These presentations are not just manipulations, although individuals may manipulate them, like Tilak's use of the Kali cult in Bengal. There's no need to reveal what a selective interpretation of the ethnic past is. However, this selection can only happen within strict limits set by existing myths, symbols, customs, and memories of a community. 

Mehrab Sarjov is a political activist in London striving for an independent Baluchistan.

Organisational tasks mobilisation phases;

 

Task one is the establishment of a movement. Intellectuals coordinate on a sheer nation-state project and identify leaders among themselves or attract others with organizational skills.

They develop one or more groups that are defined, by independence and, in turn, sustain a commitment to the cause of independence.

Insurgency usually begins with a group of like-minded individuals discussing core grievances.

During this period, the insurgency establishes an identity, cause, narrative and a firm ideological or political base. Due to ideological or other internal disputes, it can be a period of frequent fracturing and splintering.

In establishing a campaign and sustaining it; the founding leaders must reach out to intellectuals and current or would-be politicians within the population.

As Eric Hoffer writes, the movement pioneered by men of words, materialised by fanatics and consolidated by men of action. It is usually an advantage to a movement, and perhaps a prerequisite for its endurance, that different men should play these roles.

The campaign cannot abandon, the intellectuals once women and men of action are in control because the intellectuals' to conjure new projects poses a constant threat of programmatic competition that could weaken the campaign.

Coordination among the intellectuals who create nation-state projects is a daunting task because the natural tendencies of intellectuals often resist coordination. Even before propagation among other constituencies can commence, most projects fall victim to alternative projects offered by other intellectuals appealing to at least some members of the same population. Sustaining coordination among creative intellectuals may be troublesome: individual members of the intelligentsia may value their intellectual independence, and their measure of creativity can be the originality and thus the difference of their formulations, including nation-state projects.

As Hoffer stresses, Men of thought seldom work together. Teamwork is rare in intellectual or artistic undertakings. So, there is a high probability that any national secession project will face multiple alternative projects unless this tendency is constrained.

In many campaigns, practical politicians come over to the cause only in an eleventh-hour switch to save their careers. The operational task of recruiting and coordinating among practical politicians with a shallower commitment to the goal carries a risk of capture that displaces the campaign leaders and their original goals.

Thus, the first operational task of campaign leaders is building leadership, which includes recruiting intellectual would-be politicians to the cause of independence. Even in the establishment stage, a divergence in motivations between true believers and practical politicians may emerge.

Over the longer term, the establishment task includes a greater need to deter defections to other causes: a task that becomes more difficult as the number of pragmatists in the leadership increases. Containing the centrifugal forces and keeping the leadership focused on the cause of independence is essential to campaign coordination.

Mehrab Sarjov

The Zahedan massacre was one of many genocides Iranian forces have committed in Baluchistan,

 

Mehrab Sarjov

One year has passed since the protest started under the umbrella of Makki Mosque and Molavi Abdolhamid 's leadership.

We are well aware of the fact that Tehran imposed this war on Makki Mosque and dragged Molavi Abdolhamid into the current conflict. Until now, Molavi has taken his responsibilities very seriously and stood with the victims. 

The Baluch Political parties and activists have supported protesters and religious leadership, which have demanded justice for last year's massacres in Zahedan and Khash. We support regime change in Iran unconditionally. We stand with Makki Mosque and Molavi Abdolhamid as long as Molavi express people's general demands, which he has been doing.

Molavi may represent enlightenment in Iran. The Baluch nation is a progressive nation, and Molavi represents the best of it. 

One should not expect Molavi to deliver federalism for Iran or independence for Baluchistan. It is the political parties' responsibility to fulfil their manifesto commitment.

The struggle for an independent Baluchistan from Iran is as old as the Iranian occupation of Baluchistan. The movement against the Persian occupation of Baluchistan did not start with the Zahedan massacre last year. The Zahedan massacre was one of many slow genocides Iranian forces have committed in Baluchistan, and this will not be the last.

recommendation;

1- We support regime change in Iran unconditionally;

2- We support the Iranian and Baluch people's protest unconditionally;

3- considering the situation, the movement for independent Baluchistan should make its presence felt on the ground without creating a fracture in current Friday's protest.

Mehrab Sarjov is a political activist based in London,

Draft platform proposal for a transition to freedom in Iran.

There is a strong need for action now to avoid a larger ethnic conflict within the Middle East and beyond. After extensive research, the above proposal is the best method to enable a transition of governance within Iran aimed specifically at reducing ethnic conflict. I am personally responsible for this Paper. These are not (Riji Zrombesh) Baluchistan Baluchistan National Movement views. ‌ُ

Mehrab, Sarjov

 The Islamic Republic of Iran has failed to respond effectively to the demands of its people. Like its predecessors, it has failed to unite the ethnicities within its population to build a successful single nation-state. Today, Iran’s differing territorial populations still will not align with the history and culture propagated by the Iranian State.

1-      Non-Persian ethnic groups within Iran are separated  by religion, culture, language and geography

2-      Non-Persian groups within Iran seek the right to restore their cultural identity.

3-      They have a geopolitical relationship with their neighbors, which differs from the state. For example, Baluch and Afghans have a history of military cooperation; jointly fighting against the Persian and Maratha Empires.

4-      The state of Iran has implemented draconian laws against Non-Persian nations to ensure their economy does not prosper and they are tied to the state. 

5-      There is a history of warfare by Tehran against the Baluch and other Non-Persian groups.

 

We believe in the right to self-determination through legal and civil means. Citizens of the Islamic Republic of Iran request the right to a referendum to determine their future.

If dominant political actors in Iran agree on the right to self-determination through a free and fair referendum, the current, economic, social and political issues within Iran could be solved. Therefore, a referendum should be held to determine whether the Citizens of Iran want completely independent states or Asymmetric Federalism in Iran.

Route to Self-Determination

With the fall of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to avoid ethnic conflict, similar to that following the end of Libya and Syria. An Asymmetrical Federation would be implemented as a transitional Government, stabilising the Nation prior to holding a referendum on the right to Self-determination.

As part of the implementation of the Asymmetrical Federation, there would be a classical Asymmetric Federal agreement on power-sharing between the Federation States and a Central Government.

 Each Federation will have a clear geographical border managed by an autonomous governing body. Each Federations Governing body will have explicit powers, which fall within the exclusive domain of the federation to enable the successful management of its population.  The Federation would have the right to create its own rules governing the Federation’s legislature and executive and have extensive control over local development plans.

The Federation may have a range of prerogatives not found in any other part of the unitary state, such as the legal right to create restrictive immigration policies in the federation, to prohibit Citizens of the state who are not also citizens of the federacy from buying lands or establishing commercial enterprises.

Central Government will remain in Tehran and will retain powers over, foreign affairs, defence, currency, and a final court of appeals. Following the referendum, these powers can gradually transfer to federation units or independent authorities, should a Federal state vote for Self-Governance.

The territorially concentrated minority populations would have a constitutionally embedded degree of political autonomy

Existence of dispute resolution procedures:

The federal units and the state would have dispute-resolution procedures about their respective powers and prerogatives. Only in exceptional circumstances would a dispute go to the state’s highest court, and this court would be able to make binding decisions for the entire polity only as long as it does not in any way violate the constitutionally embedded arrangements

Reciprocal representation between the unitary state and the federacy;

 The citizen of the autonomous unit would be full citizens of the state, vote in state-wide elections, and have representatives in the parliament of the state as well as in their parliament. The centre would have an official representative in the federacy that would also help coordinate those activities in the federacy that fall under central state power.

The goal of the federacy arrangement is to create a high level of trust, voice, and a workable relationship between the federacies and the centre.

 

Federations will have the right to implement their own eligibility criteria for their Federal elections. For example, a citizen would not be able to vote in a federal election unless they were resident within the Federation for more than 5 years. This would not impact their eligibility for central elections. 

The people's self-determination principle should be included in any future agreements. Transition authorities should accept asymmetric federacy.

Some of the key principles, culture-making and identity-sustaining prerogatives that should be given to the self-governing legislatures are:

·       The official language of each federacy shall be the common language of the majority of people residing in that federacy.

·       The language of education in schools maintained by public funds or subsidized by public funds shall be the official language of the federacy concerned.

 

·       Only a person with the right of domicile may participate in elections of the Federal parliament, the municipal councils and the other positions of trust within the Federation. The power to grant the right of domicile is vested in the federacy.

·       The right of a person without the right of domicile to exercise a trade or profession for personal gain may be limited.

·       The Federation reserves the right to limit the acquisition of property of persons who are not Federal citizens.

·       Federation shall have legislative power in respect of public order and security, health care medical treatment, the design and use of the flag and coastal arms, farming, forestry, hunting and fishing, creation of an offence and the extent of the penalty for such an offence in respect of a matter falling within the legislative competence of federacies, an administrative court shall be established in federacy by State act, such court may be an act of federacy be granted jurisdiction over administrative matters within the competence of federacy.

There is a strong need for action now to avoid a larger ethnic conflict within the Middle East and beyond. After extensive research, the above proposal is the best method to enable a transition of governance within Iran aimed specifically at reducing ethnic conflict.

 

 

Chapter 1

General Provisions;

Autonomy of Baluchistan;

Baluchistan is autonomous during the transition and hereafter.

 

Section 2

The territory of Baluchistan;

 Baluchistan comprises the territory that historically has been Baluchistan, and the territorial waters directly adjacent to Baluchistan.

Section 3

 Institutions of the Baluchistan;

 Parliament shall represent the people of Baluchistan in matters relating to its autonomy. The administration of Baluchistan is vested in the Government of Baluchistan and the officials subordinate to it.

 

Section 4 Governor;

 The Governor shall represent the Government of Iran in Baluchistan. Governor shall be appointed by the President of the Republic: after having agreed on the matter with the Speaker of the Baluchistan Parliament.

 

 

Section 5

Baluchistan Delegation;

 The Baluchistan Delegation shall be a joint organ of Baluchistan and the State. Its composition, duties and expenses are defined.

 

Chapter 2

 

Right of domicile in Baluchistan;

The right of domicile in Baluchistan shall belong to

1)      a person who at the time of the entry into force of autonomous agreement had the rights of domicile under the Autonomy agreement; and 2) a child under 18 years of age who is a citizen of Iran and a resident of Baluchistan, provided that his father or mother has the right of domicile.

 

 

Section 7

Right of domicile on application

 The power to grant the right of domicile is vested in the Government of Baluchistan.

Unless there are persuasive reasons for not granting the right of domicile, it shall be granted on application to a citizen of Iran

1) Who has taken up residence in Baluchistan;

2) Who has been habitually resident in Baluchistan for at least five years without interruption;

 An,  3) who is satisfactorily proficient in the Baluchi language.

 The right of domicile may also be granted to a person who does not fulfil the requirements for a specific reason.

 

Section 8

Forfeiture of the right of domicile,

A person who forfeits the citizenship of Iran shall likewise forfeit the right of domicile.

The forfeiture persons with the right of domicile in Baluchistan may temporarily move their residence from Baluchistan shall be as provided by an Act of Baluchistan.

 

 

Section 9

 Participation in elections and eligibility for office only a person with the right of domicile may participate in the elections of the Baluchistan Parliament, the municipal councils and the other positions of trust in Baluchistan and municipal administration. Only a person with the right of domicile shall be eligible for positions of trust.

Section 10

Right to acquire real property

The limitations on the right to acquire real property or property of a similar nature in Baluchistan with full legal title shall be provided by an Act on the Acquisition of Real Property in Baluchistan. The limitations shall not apply to a person with the right of domicile.

 

Section 11

Right of trade

 

The right of a person, without the right of domiciles, to exercise a trade or profession in Baluchistan for personal gain may be limited.

However, such an Act may not be used to limit the right of trade of a person residing in Baluchistan if no person other than a spouse and minor children are employed in the trade and if the trade is not practised in business premises, an office or any other special place of business.

Section 12

Service of conscription

 A person with the right of domicile may be placed for conscription for military service or other civilian administrations. Military service in the Iran army shall be provided by the consent of the Baluchistan Parliament.

 

Chapter 3

The Baluchistan Parliament and the Government of Baluchistan;

 

Section 13

Election of the members of the Baluchistan Parliament;

The members of the Baluchistan Parliament shall be elected by direct and secret ballot. Suffrage shall be universal and equal.

 

Section 14

Opening and closing the sessions of the Baluchistan Parliament;

The sessions of the Baluchistan Parliament shall be opened and closed by the President of the Republic or, on his behalf, by the Governor. The Governor shall present the proposals and statements of the President to the Baluchistan Parliament.

 

Section 15

 Dissolution of the Baluchistan Parliament After consultation with the Speaker of the Baluchistan Parliament, the President of the Republic may dissolve the Baluchistan Parliament and order an election. The right of the Baluchistan Parliament to decide on dissolution and the ordering of an election shall be provided by an Act.

 

Section 16

 Government of Baluchistan;

 The Government of Baluchistan shall be appointed by Baluchistan Parliament.

 

 

 

 

Chapter 4

Section 17

Authority of Baluchistan;

The Baluchistan Parliament shall enact legislation for Baluchistan.

 

Section 18

Legislative authority of Baluchistan shall have legislative powers in respect of 1) the organisation and duties of the Baluchistan Parliament and the election of its members, the Government of Baluchistan and the officials and services subordinate to it;  2) the officials of Baluchistan, the collective agreements on the salaries of the employees of Baluchistan and the sentencing of the officials of Baluchistan to disciplinary punishment; 2 a) the employment pensions of the employees of Baluchistan and the elected representatives in the administration of Baluchistan, as well as of the head teachers, teachers and temporary teachers in the primary and lower secondary schools in Baluchistan;  3) the flag and coat of arms of Baluchistan and the use thereof in Baluchistan, the use of the Baluchistan flag on vessels of Baluchistan and on merchant vessels, fishing-vessels, pleasure boats and other comparable vessels whose home port is in Baluchistan, without limiting the right of State offices and services or of private persons to use the flag of the State; 4) the municipal boundaries, municipal elections, municipal administration and the officials of the municipalities, the collective agreements on the salaries of the officials of the municipalities and the sentencing of the officials of the municipalities to disciplinary punishment; 5) the additional tax on income for Baluchistan and the provisional extra income tax, as well as the trade and amusement taxes, the bases of the dues levied for Baluchistan and the municipal tax; 6) public order and security; the fire-fighting and rescue service; 7) building and planning, adjoining properties, housing; 8) the appropriation of real property and of special rights required for public use in exchange for full compensation; 9) tenancy and rent regulation, lease of land; 10) the protection of nature and the environment, the recreational use of nature, water law; 11) prehistoric relics and the protection of buildings and artifacts with cultural and historical value; 12) health care and medical treatment; burial by cremation; 13) social welfare; licences to serve alcoholic beverages; 14) education, apprenticeship, culture, sport and youth work; the archive, library and museum service, 15) farming and forestry, the regulation of agricultural production; provided that the State officials concerned are consulted prior to the enactment of legislation on the regulation of agricultural production; 16) hunting and fishing, the registration of fishing vessels and the regulation of the fishing industry; 17) the prevention of cruelty to animals and veterinary care; 18) the maintenance of the productive capacity of the farmlands, forests and fishing waters; the duty to transfer, in exchange for full compensation, unutilised or partially utilised farmland or fishing water into the possession of another person to be used for these purposes, for a fixed period; 19) the right to prospect for, lay claim to and utilise mineral finds; 20) the postal service and the right to broadcast by radio or cable in Baluchistan; 21) roads and canals, road traffic, railway traffic, boat traffic, the local shipping lanes;

22) trade, subject to the provisions of section 11, with the exception that also the Baluchistan Parliament has the power to impose measures to foster the trade referred to in the said paragraphs; 23) promotion of employment; 24) statistics on conditions in Baluchistan 25) the creation of an offence and the extent of the penalty for such an offence in respect of a matter falling within the legislative competence of Baluchistan; 26) the imposition of a threat of a fine and the implementation thereof, as well as the use of other means of coercion in respect of a matter falling within the legislative competence of Baluchistan; 27) other matters deemed to be within the legislative power of Baluchistan in accordance with the principles underlying law.

Section 19

 Decrees

By virtue, the Government of Baluchistan may issue Decrees on matters within the powers of Baluchistan power. However, provisions may be provided only by Acts of the Baluchistan parliament on the foundations of individuals’ rights or obligations and on matters that otherwise are of legislative nature under the Constitution or under the Act on the Autonomy of Baluchistan.

Section 20

Initiatives of the Baluchistan Parliament and the Government of Baluchistan;

The Baluchistan Parliament may submit initiatives on matters within the legislative power of the State. The Government of Iran shall present an initiative for the consideration of the Parliament of Iran. The Government of Baluchistan may submit initiatives on matters referred to in paragraph 1 for the issuance of Decrees and regulations for Baluchistan.

 

 

Section 21

The administrative authority of Baluchistan;

Baluchistan officials shall conduct the administration of matters within the legislative power of Baluchistan subject to the following: 1) statistical information that is necessary for the State and in possession of Baluchistan officials shall, on request, be made available for State officials;

2)statistical information for the use of Baluchistan shall be collected in cooperation with the State officials concerned; 3) the Government of Baluchistan shall obtain opinions from the State officials concerned before undertaking measures regarding a non-movable prehistoric relic; 4) the Government of Baluchistan shall obtain an opinion from the National Archives before the Baluchistan officials or the municipal or ecclesiastical officials render a decision on the destruction of documents in an archive located in Baluchistan.

Section 22

 Administrative procedure;

 An appeal shall be brought to the Baluchistan Administrative Court against a decision of an authority subordinate to the Government of Baluchistan an appeal shall be brought to the Baluchistan Administrative Court against a decision of a municipal authority; the legality of a decision may be brought to the Supreme Administrative Court. However, an appeal against a decision of the Government of Baluchistan relating to a pension may be brought to the Insurance Court.

Section 23

 Establishment of an administrative court;

 An administrative court may be established in Baluchistan. Such a court may be granted jurisdiction over administrative matters within the competence of Baluchistan.

 

Chapter 5

 Authority of the State

 

Section 24

State Acts of importance to federal units;

 The amendment of a Constitutional Act or another State Act shall not enter into force in federal units without the consent of the federation Parliaments insofar as it relates to the principles governing the right of a private person to own real property or business property in federacy units. An opinion shall be obtained from Units before the enactment of an Act of special importance to that federacy unit.

Section 25

(Obtaining an opinion from the Government federal units;

Before the President of the Republic, the Council of State, a Ministry or some other authority issues provisions that only concern Baluchistan or that otherwise are especially significant to Baluchistan; an opinion on the matter shall be obtained from the Government of Baluchistan.

Section 26

Decision and presentation;

 The President of the Republic shall make his decision on matters relating to the autonomy of Baluchistan as provided by section 41 of the Constitution.

 

 

Chapter 6

Language provisions

 

Section 27

Official language;

 The official language of Baluchistan shall be Baluchi. The language used in federation administration, federations administration and municipal administration shall be regional. The official language of the federation Delegation shall be Baluchi. The opinions and decisions of the Supreme Court referred to in this Act shall be written in Baluchi. The provisions of this Act on the language used in federal administration shall also apply, where appropriate, to the officials of the religious, unless otherwise provided by the Code.

 

 

Section 28

 Right, to use Persian;

 In a matter concerning self, a citizen of Iran shall have the right to use Persian before a court and with other State officials in federations.

 

Section 29

 Language of correspondence;

 Letters and other documents between Baluchistan officials and State officials in Baluchistan shall be written in the Baluchi language. The same provision shall apply to correspondence between the said authorities and the federations Delegation, on one hand as well as the Council of State, the officials in the central government of Iran and the superior courts and other State officials to whose jurisdiction federations or a part thereof belongs, on the other hand. 

Section 30

 Translations

On the request of a party, the courts and the County Government shall enclose a Persian translation in their documents.

.

Section 31

 Language of education;

 The language of education in schools maintained by public funds or subsidised from public funds shall be Baluch language unless otherwise provided by an Act of the federal unit.

Section 32

 Linguistic proficiency of State officials;

 The State shall organise training in the Baluchi language for the persons in its service in Baluchistan.

Section 33

 Information and regulations issued in Baluchi languages;

The Council of State shall take measures to have the necessary product and service information distributed to the consumers in the Baluchi language where possible. The Council of State shall also see the availability of regional languages of the regulations to be followed in federal units.

 

Chapter 7

Financial Management;

Section 34 Budget

The Baluchistan Parliaments shall confirm a budget; when passing a budget, they shall strive to ensure at least the same level of social benefits for their people as enjoyed by the people in the State.

 

. Section 35 Equalisation

Baluchistan shall every year receive a sum of money from State funds to cover the costs of autonomy.

The sum shall be determined in a special equalisation procedure. The equalisation shall take place retroactively for every calendar year. Advance payments of the amount of equalisation shall be made every year.

 

Section 36

Extraordinary grant;

 An extraordinary grant may be given on the proposition of Baluchistan.

Section 37 Special subsidy

Baluchistan shall be subsidised by State funds to

1) Prevent or remove substantial economic disorders that affect especially Baluchistan

 2) Cover the costs of a natural disaster, oil spill or another incident. The Government of Baluchistan shall initiate the proceedings for a subsidy at the latest in the year following the emergence of the costs.

 

Chapter 8

Governor and the Baluchistan Delegation;

 

Section 39

Appointment of the Governor;

 A person who has the qualifications for conducting the administration well and for attending to State security shall be appointed Governor.

 The President of the Republic shall appoint the Governor after having agreed on the matter with the Speaker of the Baluchistan Parliament. If a consensus is not reached, the President shall appoint the Governor from among five candidates nominated by the federacy Parliament.

 

Section 40

 Acting Governor;

When the office of the Governor is vacant or when the Governor is prevented from attending to his duties, the President may, after having agreed on the matter with the Speaker of the federacy Parliament, appoint a suitable person as Acting Governor.

 

 

Chapter 9

International Treaties;

Section 41

Dismissal of the Governor;

 The Speaker of the federacy Parliament shall be heard before deciding on a matter relating to the dismissal of the Governor.

 

Section 42

 Negotiations on international treaties;

 The Government of the federacy may propose negotiations on a treaty or another international obligation to the appropriate State officials.

The Government of the federacy shall be informed of negotiations on a treaty or another international obligation if the matter is subject to the competence of the federacy. If the discussions otherwise relate to things of vital importance to federacy, the Government of federacy shall be informed of the negotiations, if appropriate. The Government of federacy shall be reserved the opportunity to participate in the talks if there is a peculiar reason for the same.

 

Section 43

 Entry into force of international treaties;

 If a treaty or another international obligation binding on Iran contains a matter within the competence of the Federacy, the Federacy Parliament must consent to the statute implementing that term to have it enter into force in a federacy. If the treaty is contrary to this, it will enter into force in the federacy only if the regional Parliament gives its consent by a qualified majority of two-thirds of the votes.

 

Chapter 10

Entry into force and transitory provisions

Section 44

 Right of domicile;

 A person habitually resident in federacies at the time of the entry into force of this Act shall, upon request to the Government of the federacy, have the right to gain the right of domicile.

Section44

Trade;

 A person habitually resident in the federacy at the time of the entry into force of this Act shall, after having resided in the federacy for five years without interruption, have the right to practice in a trade in the federacy. The private persons, companies, co-operations, associations and other corporations and foundations that at the time of the entry into force of this Act practice a trade in the federacy.

Mehrab sarjov

sarjov@hotmail.com

00447896888892

appendix

Asymmetric Federalism

Symmetry refers to the uniformity of the system. Conversely, asymmetry denotes the diversity among members of states, which is articulated politically through component units possessing varying degrees of autonomy and power.

In other ways words, it is the extent to which component states do not share in the conditions and concerns common to the federal system as a whole.

While some sort of asymmetry exists in most federal states, the type and extent of asymmetric vary, as well as, of the conditions that lead to asymmetry.

Cultural, economic, social and political factors in combination have in all federations produced asymmetrical variations in the power and influence of different constituent units.

De jure or constitutionally asymmetry refers to asymmetry that is constitutionally entrenched asymmetry; it is the extent to which the constitution grants a better understanding of those two types of asymmetry, let us manifested in a federation.

De facto asymmetry;

De jure asymmetry;

Uses;

Fiscal capacities;

Legal process

Parliamentary representation

Constitutional decision-making;

 

 

 

Asymmetric federalism means federalism based on unequal powers and relationships in political, administrative, and fiscal arrangements between the units constituting a federation.

Asymmetry in the arrangements in a federation can be viewed in both vertical (between the Centre and states) and horizontal (among the states) senses.

Political and Constitutional Asymmetry

 

Recognising the distinctive cultural differences in the country and permitting self-rule within the scheme of a shared rule to territorially concentrated minorities is how asymmetrical federalism works in India.

Such functioning pertains to de facto and de jure asymmetry, where the former is abundant while the latter is limited.

Furthermore, such an arrangement only proves that an asymmetrical constitutional setup is indisputably necessary for a multicultural and multinational country such as India to protect the rights of the community and minorities.

This setup facilitates the accommodation of multiple yet complementary identities.

While in every federal nation, the former is based on the territorial and demographic sizes of the constituent units, the latter characterises the Constitution’s extension of legislative and executive powers to the constituent units.

“What is considered to be equal for one is unequal for the other.

For national minorities like the Quebecois, Federalism implies a federation of peoples, and decisions regarding the power of federal subunits should recognise and affirm the equal status of the founding people, on this, granting similar powers to regional-base and nationality-based units is in fact deny equality of the minority nation, by reducing its status to that of regional division within majority nation”.