Tuesday, September 6, 2016

India-Iran Chabahar Agreement: The Geopolitics of Baluchistan Regional and International Implications

India-Iran Chabahar Agreement: The Geopolitics of Baluchistan Regional and International Implications

Dr. Mohammad Hassan Hosseinbor


The Chabahar Agreement signed between the Indian Prime Minister Modi and Iranian President Rouhani in May of this year will enable India to develop the Chabahar Port in Iranian Baluchistan as a major economic and strategic corridor linking India to Afghanistan and Central Asian markets. The Agreement is seen as India’s strategic response to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) under which China will invest about $47 billion to link Western China via overland roads, pipelines, and railways to Gwadar Port in Eastern Baluchistan. The Indo-Chinese rivalry underscores the geopolitical significance of Baluchistan as a focal point in the New Great Game played by the US, China, and India in Asia. This paper addresses the local, regional, and international implications of the two emerging strategic seaports and their impact on the Arabian Gulf and the Baluch movement in Iran.
Chabahar is India’s response to China’s move in Gwadar. Both ports are part of Baluchistan, on the Arabian Sea coast within 70 kilometers of each other. Therefore, an understanding of Chabahar will be difficult without reference to Gwadar and vice versa. This paper is divided into three parts. The first covers the historical background and geopolitical significance of Baluchistan and its two strategic seaports. The second deals with the regional implications reflecting the role of regional actors namely Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The third treats the international implications of the Indo-Chinese rivalry over Chabahar and Gwadar, respectively, as well as the US-China competition in the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, and beyond.
Part I
Baluchistan and Its Geostrategic Location: the Importance of Chabahar
The ports of Chabahar and Gwadar are located on Baluchistan’s Arabian Sea coast stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to Karachi. The geostrategic location of Baluchistan underscores the importance of the two ports. Therefore, the historical background and the geostrategic importance of Baluchistan are presented first to provide the context to better understand Chabahar and Gwadar’s significance.
Until the advent of British Colonialism in the mid-19th century, Baluchistan maintained its independence, for the most part, from the surrounding empires. This is reflected in the fact that the pre-division period is known by the Baluch as the Baluch Doura or the Baluch era, a historical concept used by the Baluch to refer to the state of affairs in Baluchistan prior to its division and occupation by Iran and Pakistan.
The Baluch Doura survived the British colonial rule (1858-1947) because the British did not replace the Baluch political rule and institutions, but simply created its own parallel system of administration to control the defense and external affairs of an otherwise an independent Baluchi state[1].
Under the British Empire, Baluchistan was divided into three parts. The Goldsmid Line, drawn in 1871 and demarcated in 1896, gave western Baluchistan to Persia. The Baluch in Iran, however, maintained their independence until 1928 when, with British approval, Reza Shah Pahlavi occupied and forcefully annexed western Baluchistan into Iran. The Durand Line, drawn also by the British in 1894, further divided eastern Baluchistan between British India and Afghanistan. Upon the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent in 1948, Baluchistan regained its independence for a short time, but was invaded and annexed by Pakistan the same year. These events have led to the rise of Baluch nationalism, which is the driving force behind the Baluch quest for independence.
The Geostrategic Importance of Baluchistan: the New Great Game
Baluchistan – meaning the Baluch homeland – covers about 240,000 square miles with a coastline stretching nearly 1000 miles from the Strait of Hormuz to Karachi in Pakistan. It occupies one of the most strategic locations in the world, linking the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. It is also one of the richest lands in terms of natural resources including oil, gas, uranium, coal, gold, iron ore, and immense seabed resources along its long coastline, including its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone.
Baluchistan has an estimated population of around 35 million including 7 million in Iranian-occupied western Baluchistan; 25 million in Pakistani-occupied eastern Baluchistan, Sind, and Punjab; and around 3 million in Afghanistan. In addition, there is a large Baluchi population numbering more than a million in the neighboring Arabian Gulf states. There are also significant numbers of Baluch living in India, East Africa, and Turkilometersenistan, as well as in diaspora in Europe, US, and Australia. Baluch, like Kurds, are one of the largest nations in the Middle East and South Asia without a state of their own.
Baluchistan borders the Indus River and Punjab in the East, the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman in the West, the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean in the South, and the Iranian provinces of Kerman and Khorasan as well as Afghanistan in the North[2].
The strategic location of Baluchistan places Chabahar and Gwadar ports at the center of the growing rivalry among the US, China, and India in the Indian Ocean, South Asia, and Central Asia. Baluchistan’s geopolitical significance is based on this strategic location and its tremendous reserves of natural resources summarized as follows:
1. Located directly at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz on a coastline stretching nearly 1000 miles to Karachi, Baluchistan occupies a strategic position with a commanding view of the shipping lines carrying 40 percent of world oil supplies. The world economy depends on these supplies and securing the shipping lines passing through the Strait of Hormuz and Arabian Sea is of vital importance to the world economy.
2. Baluchistan connects the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia via sea, land, and air and can serve as a major hub for trade, energy, transportation, and communication links among the countries of these regions.
3. Baluchistan holds large reserves of natural resources including silver, uranium, aluminum, and oil, gas, gold, copper, and platinum. As we know, the competition for natural resources is intensifying among the major economic and military powers, attracting them to Baluchistan.
4. Baluchistan is the most viable economic route for overland roads, railways, and pipelines from Central Asia, China, and Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea and from the Middle East and South Asia to China and Central Asia. If connected, the land-locked Afghanistan and energy rich Central Asian countries will gain access to international markets for their energy exports.
5. With a coastline of about 1000 miles, Baluchistan would have jurisdiction and ownership of the sea and seabed resources along its coast for two hundred miles under Exclusive Economic Zone provisions of the Law of the Sea, a major factor in the Baluch drive for independence. The energy resources in Baluchistan’s coastal seabed are reported to be the largest in the world.
Map of Gwadar& Chabahar, Source: Yale Global Online
Part II
The Chabahar Agreement and Its Regional Implications: the Role of Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Arabian Gulf States
The Chabahar Agreement between India and Iran is part of 12 pacts signed by the Indian Prime Minister Modi and Iranian President Rouhani during a summit in early May of this year. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani also joined Modi and Rouhani for the signing of a trilateral trade agreement facilitating transit of goods among these countries and providing India with access to Afghanistan via the Chabahar port. Under this Agreement, India will invest $500 million in expanding and operating Chabahar port in Iranian Baluchistan and transforming it into India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia. India will undertake several other major projects worth $20 billion including setting up an LNG plant and a gas cracker unit in the Chabahar free trade zone.[3]
The Chabahar Agreement has been described as a “strategic game changer”[4] not only for Iran, India, and Afghanistan, but also for Pakistan, Arabian Gulf states, China, and Central Asia. It has wide ranging strategic, economic, diplomatic, and political implications benefiting Iran, India, and Afghanistan at the expense of their rivals[5].
Iran
Coming in the aftermath of the nuclear deal and lifting of Western sanctions, the Agreement provides Iran with far-reaching economic and trade opportunities, which could be as important as the lifting of economic sanctions by the West. To sweeten the deal during the Summit, Prime Minister Modi returned part of the $6.4 billion owned by the Indian refiners to Iran and pledged to quickly transfer the rest[6]. First, the deal helps Iran secure and expand a greater market share for its energy products in India at the expense of Saudi Arabia.
Second, it serves as a catalyst for attracting substantial international investments needed for developing Chabahar and its infrastructure. In addition to India, Iran has granted land and facilities to Afghanistan, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and China for investments in the Chabahar Free Trade Zone. Iran has also built a 600 kilometer highway linking Chabahar to Zahedan, the capital of Iranian Baluchistan, and 240 kilometers away from Malik on the Iran-Afghanistan border. Work is underway to connect it to Malik and then to the Zaranj-Delaram highway completed by India in Nimroz province in Afghanistan. Iran has also started constructing a railway linking Chabahar to Zahedan where it will connect with the Iranian rail network and to Central Asia and CIS countries.
Third, the deal serves as a major source of revenue from duties and tariffs imposed on goods passing through Chabahar as well as from transit and transportation fees generated from the use of Iranian roads, railways, and pipelines linking Chabahar to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Iran is expected to levy sizable duties on imports coming from India and the Gulf region and exports originating from Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. Fourth, Iran sees Chabahar as an alternative to Bandar Abbas located inside the Arabian Gulf west of the Strait of Hormuz. Any blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would cripple Iran’s trade and commerce and would render Bandar Abbas unusable. Unlike Bandar Abbas, Chabahar is Iran’s only deep water port, giving it access to the Indian Ocean.
Geopolitically, Iran also considers the Chabahar Agreement as a strategic victory for boosting its political influence in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Southwest Asia; for strengthening its position in the Arabian Gulf against Saudi Arabia; and for projecting its power in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The expanded political, economic, trade, and investment ties between India and Iran could lead to a strategic alliance paving the way for stronger naval cooperation in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Similarly, growing trade and commerce among Iran, Afghanistan, and CIS countries could lead to greater political influence by Iran in those countries at the expense of Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The roads, railways, and pipelines linking Chabahar to Afghanistan and CIS countries provide Iran with major political and diplomatic leverages for influencing those countries at the expense of its rivals.
With a view to counter its regional rival Saudi Arabia, Iran is set to use Chabahar and energy agreements with India to further strengthen its strategic interests in the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Sea for regional dominance and greater market share for its energy products. It is using Chabahar as a major land-air-naval base to project power in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The port is a launching pad for Iran’s arms shipments to Houthi rebels in Yemen. Iran’s fleet of submarines is based in Chabahar. Referring to Saudi-Iranian competition, Lindsay Hughes, a research analyst at the Indian Ocean Research Programme, states that:
“Iran, as is commonly known, has been and remains locked in a rivalry with Saudi Arabia for regional pre-eminence and market share for its energy products. It is aware that it can increase its regional influence, and thus achieve its strategic goals, only if its economy develops. It is the acute rivalry that it has with Saudi Arabia that saw it forgo the opportunity to attend the recent summit on oil in Doha on April 7. Iran refused to attend the meeting, which was called by major oil-producing countries in an effort to boost the current low oil prices by freezing production. Iran insisted that it would continue to increase its production in order to regain the market share it had lost to Saudi Arabia and other oil producers due to the sanctions, despite threats by Saudi Arabia to do likewise, which could keep prices low and possibly force Iran to capitulate. Tehran will no doubt be banking on the fact that while it has prodigious amounts of proven oil and gas reserves, Riyadh has only oil reserves, albeit being the largest oil producer in the world. Tehran knows that Saudi oil exports and market share can only decrease as long as US crude oil supplies remains at very high levels…. Given those factors, it is critical that Iran increases its market share of energy products, which makes its growing relationship with India that much more important.”[7]
Tehran’s refusal to attend the Doha oil summit was a clear signal to OPEC and other oil producing countries that “Saudi influence over oil production and exports is, if not waning, not as salient as was previously thought.”[8]
Pakistan
The Chabahar port, along with the Afghan-Iran-India trilateral agreement, is bound to affect the regional dynamics of the Iran-Pakistan relationship. It has created a direct economic contest with Gwadar, less than 70 kilometers east of Chabahar, in Pakistani Baluchistan. Like Chabahar, Gwadar is a deep sea port located on vital maritime lines and overland routes connecting China and Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Iran’s use of Chabahar undermines Pakistan’s plans for linking Gwadar to Central Asia and Afghanistan via railways, pipelines, and overland routes, thus reducing the prospects for increased trade and commerce with and access to major energy resources in those countries. More immediately, access to Chabahar frees Afghanistan from using Gwadar and Karachi ports in Pakistan, thus threatening stable sources of revenue, which are the tariffs and transition fees Islamabad charges for the use of those ports.
Politically, Iran stands to gain in competing with Pakistan over influence in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Middle East, an objective shared by Pakistan’s archenemy India. Due to its dependence on the Pakistani ports, Afghanistan has had to “comply to a degree with Pakistan’s Afghan policy, which is formulated to a very large extent by the Pakistani Army. The maritime access that Chabahar now gives to Afghanistan means that Kabul can formulate its policies independent of its concerns about Pakistan.”[9]
Similarly, the Chabahar-Gwadar rivalry is seen by Tehran as a means to counter the Saudi-Pakistan alliance in order to strengthen Iran’s position in the Arabian Gulf region. With the presence of India in Chabahar on its Western borders and the loss of its influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan can ill-afford to divert its attention and resources from its main fronts with India in the East, thus giving Iran a freer hand to maneuver in the Middle East.
Strategically, Pakistan feels encircled and is alarmed by the Indian presence in Chabahar. Pakistani military fears that the port can be used by India to eavesdrop on Pakistan and to gather intelligence on its naval moves in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. This perception is further boosted by Prime Minister Modi’s statement that “We have also agreed to enhance interaction between our defence and security institutions on regional and maritime security.”[10] As a result, Pakistan-Iran competition in the Arabian Sea is expected to intensify with far reaching consequences for Southwest Asia and the Middle East.
Afghanistan
The Chabahar Agreement is considered a key victory for Afghanistan. In the words of Michael Kugelman, a South Asia specialist at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, “this Chabahar project is more important to Afghanistan than to anybody else. It could be an economic bonanza for an economically troubled country…”[11]. Afghanistan will be able to ship its goods, including its vast natural resources with an estimated value of $700 billion, via Chabahar to key markets in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. It could import more easily key goods it needs. In addition to trade and commerce, Afghanistan can serve as a transit route for roads, railways, and pipelines linking Central Asian countries via Afghanistan to Chabahar, a vital source of transit revenues for that country. Politically, use of Chabahar could eliminate Afghanistan’s dependency on Pakistani ports, thus allowing Kabul to pursue its own independent foreign policy as mentioned before.
Saudi Arabia
The presence of China and India in Gwadar and Chabahar, respectively, has brought the emerging Asian giants to the doorsteps of Arabia with far reaching ramifications for the regional balance of power in the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East; for the security of shipping lines through the Strait of Hormuz; and for the intensifying naval competition between the two Asian powers in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.
Iran’s strategy of using Chabahar as its main strategic base for projecting power in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean poses a direct threat to the Arab Gulf States making them to conduct immediate counter-measures to protect their interests.
Given the close Arab-Pakistan ties, the Saudis are certain to support their ally in the competition between Chabahar and Gwadar. Iran-Pakistan cooperation has been shaken by major tensions in their relations emanating from their competing interests in Chabahar and Gwadar and their alliances with opposing powers, namely India and China as mentioned before. Saudis could benefit from this friction. In addition, Iran-Pakistan relations could come under further stress due to the intensifying Arab-Iranian rivalry in the Arabian Gulf and the pressure it creates on Pakistan to take a side. However, given Pakistan’s weak position vis à vis India, it can hardly afford to take the Arab side against Iran as shown by Islamabad’s refusal to enter the Yemen conflict as expected by the Saudis.
These developments could pave the way for an opening toward Arab support for the Baluch struggle against Iran. Saudis could persuade Pakistan to soften its opposition to any potential Saudi support for the Iranian Baluch. There are compelling geopolitical reasons for such a Saudi policy. After all, Arabs, Persians, and Baluch are the three main actors in the Gulf. In this equation, Arab support for the Iranian Baluch is a matter of strategic necessity in confronting the Iranian hegemony in the region, a policy that can benefit Pakistan as well. The Arab-Baluch alliance is deeply rooted in the history of the Gulf region and their opposition to Persian domination. Anyway, Saudis are acting decisively to protect their interests as demonstrated in Yemen and will not defer to an outside power when their vital interests are threatened.
The Baluch Factor: The Major Hurdle
The major hurdle in developing Chabahar is fierce opposition by the Baluch nationalists fighting for independence. There are active and growing insurgencies in both Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistan that could threaten Chabahar and Gwadar corridors. The hinterland to the East, West, and North of Chabahar is inhabited by Sunni Baluch opposed to Iranian rule and designs in Baluchistan. The distance from Chabahar to Zahedan, Baluchistan’s provincial capital, is more than 600 kilometers and to the Iran-Afghan border is 840 kilometers. Both sides of the border are inhabited by the Baluch. From the North, the distance between Chabahar and the nearest Iranian cities of Bandar Abbas and Kerman is 871 kilometers and 1100 kilometers, respectively. The space between these distances constitutes the heartland of Baluchistan. It would be a formidable challenge, if not impossible, for the Iranian government to protect such long distances and secure Chabahar in the face of widespread Baluch opposition, particularly if this opposition is supported by Iran’s regional adversaries and world powers. The projected roads, railways, pipelines, and Free Trade Zone facilities will be inviting targets for Baluch insurgents.
Historically, Iran and Pakistan have benefited from the division of Baluchistan and are united in maintaining the status quo by suppressing any demand for Baluch autonomy. They cooperated against the Dadshah revolt in Iranian Baluchistan in the 1950s when Pakistan arrested and extradited Dadshah’s brother and his companions to Iran. More recently, Pakistan arrested brothers of Jundallah leader Abdul Malik Riggi, and returned them to be executed by Iran in 2011. The policy of suppressing Baluch is certain to continue for as long as it can be maintained by both governments.
The issue of the two ports has reinvigorated Baluch nationalism in both Iran and Pakistan, giving a new impetus to their quest for independence. They see their national movement as a direct response to the division and occupation of their homeland by Pakistan and Iran and these countries’ oppressive, exploitative, and discriminatory policies toward the Baluch. They consider Iran and Pakistan as occupiers whose decisions on Chabahar and Gwadar are self-serving and against Baluch interests. Therefore, they are vehemently opposed to Indian and Chinese moves in Chabahar and Gwadar, respectively, on the ground that the Baluch are the rightful owners and that they were not consulted about nor consented to Delhi’s and Beijing’s involvements.
Baluch nationalists also point to the fact that they have never accepted nor recognized the Goldsmid Line dividing the Baluch between Iran and Pakistan nor the Durand Line separating Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have struggled relentlessly to regain their lost freedom and to reassert their sovereignty over their homeland. This is evidenced by several major insurrections by the Baluch against Pakistan in 1948, 1958, 1962, 1973, and the current insurgency which has been growing in strength and gaining momentum since its eruption in 2005. Similarly, there have been continued uprisings among the Baluch against Iran ever since its forceful annexation of western Baluchistan in 1928, including the tribal revolts in Sarhad in the 1930s and 1940s, Mir Dadshah’s revolt in the 1950s, the insurrection by the Baluch Liberation Front in the 1960s and 1970s, and the ongoing Baluch insurgency against the Iranian clerical regime.
The Chabahar and Gwadar issue has intensified the Baluch struggle against Iran and Pakistan, providing Baluch nationalists with a stronger momentum internally and internationally. As mentioned earlier, Baluch insurgents are active against both Iranian and Pakistani governments in their respective parts of Baluchistan. Although the insurgency in Pakistan is much stronger, the Baluch insurgency in Iran is spreading fast and wide and is slowly evolving into a mass movement against Iran and its plans in Chabahar.
Externally, Baluch nationalists have launched a major campaign in opposition to the Chabahar Agreement and are calling for independence from Iran. Due to their efforts, the international media has seen a much wider coverage of events in Iranian Baluchistan than ever before. Similarly, the human rights violations in Iranian Baluchistan are documented and reported more frequently by international human rights organizations. The plight of the Baluch and Baluchistan is receiving greater exposure in the halls of Western governments and international organizations.
The campaign for independence has alarmed the governments of both Iran and Pakistan. Iranian officials regularly and publicly denounce the US and Saudi Arabia for their alleged support of the Baluch insurgency in Iranian Baluchistan. Similarly, Pakistan has officially accused India of assisting Baluch rebels in its territory. Neither government, however, has produced any evidence to back its claims and there is no independent evidence to this effect.
Part III
Chabahar, Gwadar, and the Great Powers: the International Implications
The geopolitical implications of the Chabahar and Gwadar seaports are enormous for the Indo-Chinese and the American-Chinese rivalries in Asia and the Indian Ocean. All three great powers are showing renewed interests in Baluchistan for its strategic ports and geopolitical location. This has, in turn, given a new impetus to the Baluch national movement and its quest for independence. After all, Baluchistan lost its independence during the nineteenth-century Anglo-Russian rivalry referred to by historians as the “Great Game.” That competition of great powers brought Baluchistan under the hegemony of Britain as her forward base to prevent Russian advances toward British India and the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf. The division of Baluchistan is another legacy of the Great Game that left the Baluch at the mercy of Britain’s client states, namely Pakistan and Iran.
Today, there is a New Great Game played out in Asia and the Indian Ocean by the US, China, and India. The dynamics of the New Game are the same as before: projection of power, competition for resources, the search for spheres of influence, and pursuit of their interests. In this context, the strategic ports of Chabahar and Gwadar are emerging as major focal points in this rivalry for the same main reason that attracted the great powers to Baluchistan in the 19th century: its geostrategic importance. It can be said with confidence that Baluchistan is one of the most strategic lands in the world, and the Baluch nationalists are ready to advance their cause by capitalizing on the opportunities created by these great power rivalries in the region.
India
India’s initiative in Chabahar is intended primarily at countering its archrival China, securing its energy supplies, encircling its enemy Pakistan, and expanding its influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Symbolically, the move is seen as a bold assertion of India’s role as a major player and successor of the British Empire in the subcontinent.
Strategically, Chabahar will enable India to directly challenge the Chinese moves in Gwadar in Pakistani Baluchistan. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a $47 billion project linking Western China via roads, railways and pipelines to Gwadar, provides China with direct access to the Indian Ocean. Delhi sees China’s buildup of a naval base and listening post in Gwadar as a threat to India’s navy in the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, and the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, the CPEC is seen as a strategic move by China and its proxy Pakistan to encircle India in West Asia. Access to Chabahar is part of the Indian strategy to check the Chinese moves in the Arabian Seas, Strait of Hormuz, and West Asia. In addition, access to Afghanistan through Chabahar solidifies the Afghan-Indian alliance against Pakistan and paves the way for India’s access to Central Asia.
Equally important are Indian plans to transform Chabahar into a major economic, trade, and industrial hub in the Middle East and a spring board for access to Afghanistan and Central Asian markets. The port will enable Delhi to better secure energy supplies from Iran, the Middle East, and Central Asia and to expand the market share for Indian trade and commerce in these regions. India ranks second after China in oil imports from Iran. Chabahar serves to solidify India-Iran energy ties and provide Delhi with access to new energy sources in Central Asia through Afghanistan. As the third largest and fastest growing economy in Asia, energy security is paramount in India’s move in Chabahar and its long term plans for linking the port via overland pipelines to Central Asia and via undersea pipeline to India.
Access to Chabahar has created a new momentum for India’s energy drive in Central Asia and its strategy to counter the growing Chinese influence in that region. Chabahar provides Delhi with a viable option to sideline the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline (TAPIP) in favor of a sub-sea gas pipeline from Oman and Iran to India. This plan was first discussed by the foreign ministers of the three countries in February 2014, but was not pursued due to the US opposition and Western sanctions on Iran. With the lifting of the sanctions, this plan has become feasible and high on the Indian agenda. This is particularly the case due to India’s serious reservations about TAPIP passing through Pakistan and risks associated with it[12].
Therefore, it is anticipated that India would expedite its plans for connecting Central Asia via pipeline to Chabahar where Delhi can link it to the Oman-Iran-India under-sea pipeline currently under consideration. With this in mind, Indian Prime Minister Modi and Turkmenistan President Berdimuhamedov met and signed seven agreements regarding natural gas, defense, and petrochemicals in mid-July 2015. As noted by Future Directions International: “Turkmenistan’s support for India’s desire to join Ashgabat Agreement on trade and transit, which includes Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Oman, can only add to India’s need to make this pipeline a reality.”[13]
If implemented, the pipeline connecting Central Asia to India via Chabahar would have profound geopolitical implications. It would greatly enhance India’s energy security and its access to Central Asia’s vast energy resources. It would boost India’s political and economic standing in Central Asia and strengthen its position in countering China’s growing influence in the region. It would provide CIS countries an alternative for exporting their oil and gas to Asia and Europe through Chabahar, thus lessening their dependency on Russia. Given the historically close Indo-Russian ties, Russia would be less alarmed by India than China competing in CIS, a Russian sphere of influence. India and Russia could join forces in countering the Chinese influence in the region. Russia could also join India in using the same pipeline for exporting its oil and gas to Asia.
China
The Gwadar-Chabahar contest is a reflection of the broader rivalry between China and India for hegemony in Asia. As such, the strategic importance of the two emerging ports is better understood in the context of the Indo-Chinese rivalry in the Indian Ocean, Afghanistan, and Central Asia; China’s alliance with and support of Pakistan; Indo-China border disputes; and the two powers’ never-ending thirst for natural resources. While India’s plans for Chabahar are in the early stages of implementation, China’s plans to develop Gwadar as a major deep seaport – equipped with an airport as well as industrial, commercial, and naval facilities – have proceeded for more than a decade and are in an advanced stage. The next phase is to connect the port to Western China through a network of roads, railways, and pipelines planned under the massive $47 billion CPEC project. Although it has not officially reacted, China, like its proxy Pakistan, considers the Chabahar Agreement as a direct challenge to CPEC and China’s naval facilities in Gwadar.
Gwadar is the ultimate strategic prize for such massive Chinese investment in Pakistan under CPEC. It will give China a major beachhead on the Indian Ocean close to the Strait of Hormuz, “effectively making [China] a two-ocean power,” in the words of Claude Rakisits, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.[14] Once finished, it will have dual-use civilian-military facilities including a naval base for Chinese warships and submarines as well as a listening post to monitor the US and Indian naval moves in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Given its commanding view of the Strait of Hormuz, Gwadar can be used by the Chinese navy to threaten or blockade that narrow waterway should hostilities erupt with the US or India. Through direct overland pipeline access to the Indian Ocean, the Chinese Navy can bypass the Indian and US navies in the Indian Ocean and avoid the Strait of Malacca in case of any potential blockade by the US Navy. In short, access to Gwadar will further strengthen the China-Pakistan position against India.
The economic advantage of Gwadar for China and Pakistan could equal its strategic importance. Gwadar is developed with a view to transform it into a major commerce hub, especially for exports of Chinese goods to the Middle East, Europe, and Africa and for imports of goods and energy supplies needed to fuel the growing Chinese economy. Most of the oil imported by China and Pakistan comes from the Middle East in close proximity to Gwadar. Upon its completion, the Gwadar port is expected to serve as the key conduit for energy shipments via pipelines to Western China, thus ensuring greater energy security.
China’s plans and activities in Gwadar have alarmed India and are of concern to Washington as well. In a report on Pakistan published by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis in Delhi, India sees a direct threat from the Chinese presence in Gwadar. It states that the “Gwadar port being so close to the Strait of Hormuz also has implications for India as it would enable Pakistan to exercise control over energy routes. It is believed that Gwadar will provide Beijing with a facility to monitor US and Indian naval activity in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, respectively, as well as any future maritime cooperation between India and US.”[15] Given such perceptions, the Chabahar-Gwadar contest will continue for the foreseeable future because there is no end in sight for the Indo-Chinese rivalry in Asia.
Like India’s plans in Chabahar, China’s designs in Gwadar also face a major hurdle in the widespread Baluch insurgency in Pakistani Baluchistan. Referring to the Gwadar-Chabahar contest and security situation in Pakistani Baluchistan, an unclassified diplomatic cable to the US Department of State, dated December 31, 2015, reported:
“Gwadar would serve to check India’s own strategic ambitions, as Islamabad leverages Beijing against New Delhi. The problem is that these are all long-range plans — and dreams. They conflict with messy ground-level realities. Visiting Gwadar for a week in 2008, I was struck not only by how isolated it was, between pounding sea and bleak desert, but how unstable was the region of Baluchistan, which lies immediately beyond the port in all landward directions. Ethnic Baluchi rebel leaders told me that they would never permit roads and pipelines to be built there, until their grievances with the Pakistani government in faraway Islamabad were settled. The security situation is indeed fraught with peril. The Chinese know this. They know that a pipeline network from Gwadar into Central Asia and China must await the political stabilization of Afghanistan — and Pakistan, too. Until such a day, Gwadar, while a potentially useful coaling station for a budding Chinese navy, constitutes, in essence, a road to nowhere.”[16]
United States
The US broadly shares India’s concerns over Chinese naval presence and activities in Gwadar and the threat it could pose to the Strait of Hormuz and shipping lines in the Arabian Sea. But unlike Delhi which sees an immediate threat, Washington looks at China’s actions in Gwadar as a long-term threat. As noted in the unclassified diplomatic cable mentioned earlier, “Indeed, Gwadar is important: not for what it is today, but for what it will indicate about Beijing’s intentions in the coming years and decades.”[17] The main US concern is that Gwadar, when and if connected to China, could give it potential strategic and economic advantage in the region. Washington’s threat perception reflects its position as a superpower with overwhelming naval superiority over China for the foreseeable future.
The US also supports the Chabahar Agreement with some reservation about India’s investment in Iran. As the only counterweight to China in Asia, a huge emerging market, and the largest democracy in the world, India is seen by the US as a natural strategic ally in countering China’s ambitions in Asia. Pakistan’s alliance with China and its destabilizing role in Afghanistan are other major factors shifting US policies toward closer ties with India. In this context, the Chabahar corridor is seen as beneficial to the US interests for offsetting China’s $47 billion Gwadar Corridor and for opening a new trade route to Afghanistan whose economic and political stability is important to the US. In the words of Adam V. Larkey, a South Asia expert, “The massive Gwadar project reveals China’s regional power play. There is no comparison in scale and intent between China’s role in Gwadar and India’s in Chabahar, but the Americans are pleased that India is pushing back against the Chinese expansionist mindset…”[18]
The Obama administration has expressed support for India in spite of strong objections by some US senators who are critical about Indian investments in Iran under the Chabahar accord. As testified earlier this month by the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Nisha Desai Biswal before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “For India to be able to contribute to the economic development of Afghanistan, it needs access that it does not readily have across its land boundary. And India is seeking to deepen its energy relationship with the Central Asian countries and looking for roads that would facilitate that…” Biswal, however, assured the senators that the US administration has taken up their concerns and has been “very clear with the Indians what our security concerns have been…”[19]
The Baluchistan Card
Consequently, the Indo-Chinese competition over Chabahar and Gwadar, respectively, is expected to intensify further after their completion. The major factors driving the competition are the growing Indo-Chinese and American-Chinese rivalries in Asia and the Indian Ocean and the rising tensions in the South China Sea between the US and China. It is this geopolitical dynamic that has forced Baluchistan and its two ports into their strategic calculations. The three powers see Baluchistan and its geostrategic significance as an important part of the balance of power equations in Asia and the Indian Ocean. They are playing the Baluchistan card to safeguard their interests and to advance their plans against their rivals.
The US and India find themselves, more or less, on the same side that is supporting the Chabahar corridor and countering the Chinese moves in Gwadar. None of the three powers, however, has taken an official stand on Baluchistan, at least not in their public pronouncements. But their actions on the ground in Chabahar and Gwadar reveal a different story, as described before. Behind the scenes, their strategists are busy planning their next moves and that is where Baluchistan’s future is debated. So far the status quo is preferred, but events on the ground and the dynamics of their rivalries may change and dictate a different course of action that may eventually lead to independence for Baluchistan.
The Baluch International Campaign
The Chabahar Agreement, along with the Gwadar Corridor, has boosted the drive by Baluch nationalists to internationalize the Baluchistan case in an effort to attract regional and international support for an independent state. The issue of the two ports has elevated the profile of Baluchistan among Arabian Gulf states, Western capitals, and certainly India and Afghanistan. As an example, there is an increasing awareness in the US about the Baluch and Baluchistan as well as growing calls for an independent Baluchistan in some influential circles in Washington. The issue of Chabahar and Gwadar was one of the main concerns raised during The Baluchistan Hearings held for the first time by the United States Congress in February 2012. This historical event (in which the author testified) played a key role in publicizing and internationalizing the Baluch cause. Equally important is a Resolution pending in the US Congress recognizing the rights of the Baluch and calling for an independent Baluchistan. Although opposed by the US Department of State, the Resolution, if approved, carries great moral and political weight in promoting the Baluch cause in the US and would set a precedent for other Western powers to follow.
As part of their international campaign against Iran and Pakistan, Baluch nationalists have expressed a strong desire to provide the US Navy with access and bases in Chabahar and Gwadar in exchange for US support for an independent Baluchistan. Accordingly, they have tried to make the case that the Baluch interests coincide with those of the U.S. at this juncture of history for several reasons. First, the US has reservations about Indian investment in Chabahar and is opposed to Chinese naval bases in Gwadar, issues that are of major concern to the Baluch as well. Second, the security of shipping lines through the Strait of Hormuz could be endangered by Iranian militarization of Chabahar and coastal Baluchistan, a major preoccupation of the Iranian Baluch as well. Third, the Baluch oppose the gas pipeline project for carrying Iranian gas to Pakistan, a position in line with US policies and economic sanctions imposed on Iran. Fourth, the Baluch also support the US policies against the growing Iranian hegemony in the Arabian Gulf and the threat it poses to US allies in the region. Finally, Baluchistan and Afghanistan are used by the Iranian and Pakistani military and intelligence services to shelter and support Afghan Taliban and other jihadist groups in their continuing attacks against American, NATO, and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. To counter this threat as the US prepares to withdraw from Afghanistan, it may be necessary at some point for the U.S. and Afghan governments to support Baluch nationalists who espouse secular values.
The Baluch perspective and position on Chabahar and Gwadar ports is certain to affect the development of the two ports as major economic and strategic corridors by India and China, respectively. After all, the Baluch are the rightful owners of the ports. As mentioned, restoring Baluch control and sovereignty over these strategic ports is one of the main demands of Baluch nationalists in both Iran and Pakistan.
Conclusion: Prospects
The Indo-Iranian project in Chabahar is considered a win-win for India, Iran, and Afghanistan. But its implementation faces serious challenges and its success is far from assured. The first impediment is the rising insurgency in Iranian Baluchistan. The Sunni Baluch have repeatedly attacked Iranian forces and installations in and around Chabahar. The second challenge is the chronic instability in Afghanistan which is a party to the Chabahar Agreement. The prospect that the Chabahar corridor could free Afghanistan from dependency on Gwadar and Karachi could prompt Pakistan to restore the Taliban to stop the project. Third, there is a possibility that the US and other Western countries could re-impose their sanctions in case Iran violates its obligation under the nuclear deal signed last year. Such a scenario would change Indian calculations and participation in the project. Fourth, given the rising tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, any Arab-Iranian conflict in the Arabian Gulf is bound to affect the project negatively.


[1]
Hosseinbor, M. H. (1984). Iran and Its Nationalities: the Case of BaluchNationalism. Karachi: Pakistani Adab Publications, 40-42.
[2]
Curzon, G. N. (1966). Persia and the Persian Question. London: Frank Gass & Co, 225.
[3]
Gupta, R. (2016, June 13). Iran, India, and Chabahar: Recalling the Broader Context. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 5060. Retrieved fromhttp://www.ipcs.org/article/india/spotlight-west-asia-iran-india-and-chabahar-recalling- the-broader-5060.html
[4]
Gulati, Monish. (2016, June 11). India-Iran Agreement on Chabahar is a Strategic Opportunity – Analysis. Eurasia Review. Retrieved fromhttp://www.eurasiareview.com/11062016-india-iran-agreement-on-chabahar-is-a- strategic-opportunity-analysis/
[5]
Ibid.
[6]
Bearak, M. & Murphy, B. (2016, May 24). To Sidestep Pakistan, India Embraces an Iranian Port. Washington Post. Retrieved fromhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/05/24/to-sidestep- pakistan-india-embraces-an-iranian-port/
[7]
Hughes, Lindsay. (2016, April 26). Bypassing Pakistan: Afghanistan, India, Iran, and Chabahar. Future Directions International. Retrieved fromhttp://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/bypassing-pakistan-afghanistan-india- iran-chabahar/
[8]
Ibid.
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
Gupta, R. (2016, June 13). Iran, India, and Chabahar: Recalling the Broader Context. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 5060. Retrieved fromhttp://www.ipcs.org/article/india/spotlight-west-asia-iran-india-and-chabahar-recalling- the-broader-5060.html
[11]
Kugelman, Michael. (2015, August 5). Examining the Implications of the Indo-Iranian Chabahar Port Deal. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved fromhttp://www.dw.com/en/about-dw/profile/s-30688
[12]
Hughes, Lindsay. (2016, April 26). Bypassing Pakistan: Afghanistan, India, Iran, and Chabahar. Future Directions International. Retrieved fromhttp://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/bypassing-pakistan-afghanistan-india- iran-chabahar/
[13]
Ibid.
[14]
Rakisits, Claude. (Fall 2015). A Path to the Sea: China’s Pakistan Plan. World Affairs. Retrieved fromhttp://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/path-sea-china%E2%80%99s-pakistan-plan
[15]
Jaffrelot, Christophe. (2011, Jan. 7). A Tale of Two Ports: Gwadar and Chabahar Display Chinese- Indian Rivalry in the Arabian Sea. YaleGlobal Online. Retrieved fromhttp://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/tale-two-ports
[16]
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05785443 Date: 12/31/2015. Retrieved fromhttps://wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/emailid/6383Sent
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
Choudhury, Uttara. (2016, May 26). US Backs India-Iran Chabahar Port Deal as It Outflanks China-Pakistan Gwadar Project. First Post. Retrieved fromhttp://www.firstpost.com/world/us-backs-india-iran-chabahar-port-deal-as-it-outflanks- china-pakistan-gwadar-project-2799596.html?utm_source%3Dfp_top_internal
[19]
(19) Ibid

Wednesday, August 31, 2016

India can do a lot for Balochistan, says Khan of Kalat

Khan of Kalat, Mir Suleman Dawood Jan Ahmedzai (HT/Prasun Sonwalkar )

A quiet, leafy suburb in this capital of Wales is far removed from the fire and brimstone of everyday life in Balochistan, but there is clearly a frisson in one terraced house since Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke of rights violations in the Pakistani province.
The resident of the house is the “Khan of Kalat” – holder of the respected title that influenced the fortunes of the natural resource-rich region since the 17th century.
He is Mir Suleman Dawood Jan Ahmedzai, 52, who left Pakistan in 2006 and sought refuge in Britain.
It is not only 7,700 km that separate Ahmedzai’s life in Cardiff from that in Kalat, where he owns several palaces and land and once moved around with all the appurtenances of a ruler.
His grandfather acceded the Khanate of Kalat, the largest princely state in the erstwhile Balochistan Agency, to Pakistan in March 1948 “by the barrel of the gun”.
Ahmedzai is reputed to be one of the most acceptable and popular leaders across Balochistan. His writ reportedly runs across the Baloch-inhabited regions of neighbouring Afghanistan and Iran, with the capacity to mobilise a large number of people.
Sporting the traditional Baloch cap, Ahmedzai – seen by some locals as a “king without his kingdom” – spoke to Hindustan Times with enthusiasm about Modi’s remarks, what he and others expect from India, and the implications of China’s presence in the restive Pakistani province for India. Here are the excerpts:
How do you see recent remarks by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Balochistan?
We welcome the Indian Prime Minister’s brave and long-awaited stance on Balochistan. We Baloch are looking forward to work with the Indians and others for peace, prosperity and security in south Asia. He will be remembered by the Baloch nation for a long time. I have spoken to a number of tribal chiefs, leaders and people – they are all looking for peace, stability and security. The Baloch, Indian and other nations who have been the victims of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism can together defeat it.
What do you expect from India?
India can do a lot diplomatically and about the violation of human rights that your prime minister spoke about. India can help us at the United Nations and at the International Court of Justice. Together with our supporters in the US, we can at least get assets of the leading lights of Pakistan frozen, to begin with. We can send a delegation to New Delhi to meet the prime minister, Indian political parties and parliamentarians to explain our cause. We must explore new ways of cooperation between India and Balochistan. We can help remove the threat to India from its western border.
Critics say Modi’s remarks were just a counter to the Kashmir issue. Do you think he is really interested in Balochistan?
We can’t be compared to Jammu and Kashmir. The cynics may say that India will use Balochistan to put pressure on Pakistan to stop sponsoring terrorism in India. Jammu and Kashmir is important to Pakistan because of water and food security. But Indian national security and future economic growth is dependent on an independent Balochistan – how? China and Pakistan will surround India if Baloch aspiration for independence is suppressed and if the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is accomplished. India will be a permanent loser. I believe Mr Modi is interested in India’s national interest, and an independent Balochistan is in India’s national interest.
I am a positive person: I believe Mr Modi is a genuine and courageous man. I also believe nation-states have interests and leaders do what is in the best of their national interest.
What really happened in 2006? Why did you flee Pakistan?
I did not flee. I summoned the Baloch ‘jirga’ (council of tribal chiefs) and decided to take the Balochistan case to the International Court of Justice. After I left, Pakistan bought the loyalties of some members of the supreme council – without going into too much detail. The positive side is that I have lobbied with success for an independent Balochistan. For the first time in history, there was a hearing in the US Congress on an independent Balochistan.
What are your plans for Balochistan – do you plan to return; if so, when?
I have one plan and that is to regain independence for Balochistan, which was annexed by Pakistan at the point of a barrel. I never had a plan to return to Pakistan, but I have a plan to return to an independent Balochistan.
If the Punjabis (of Pakistan) and Chinese succeed in their CPEC plan, the Baloch will become an ignorable minority and lose their land, culture and way of life permanently. But India will be the greatest loser.
China and Pakistan have a plan for India, I am sure you are aware of it. Pakistan as a state is failing: Islam says take care of your neighbours, but you are poking (your) nose in every neighbour, be it India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, China. We should have the courage to terminate Pakistan’s use of terrorism as state policy.
Do you still plan to pursue the Baloch case at the International Court of Justice?
I have never stopped pursuing the case of illegal occupation and human rights violations. We approached the Americans and got a great response from parliamentarians there. I am grateful to the congressmen and women there, NGOs and European members of parliament for their support. I am also grateful to the recent positive remarks of (former Afghan president) Hamid Karzai and the foreign minister of Bangladesh.
The situation in Balochistan is very bad. There are no accurate estimates, but 25,000 people are said to be missing and over a million displaced. Pakistan’s rule over Balochistan has never been legitimate, now it has lost control over Balochistan. The Indian, American, Afghan, Arab states and others should realise that the future is Balochistan, an independent Balochistan.
Britain’s foreign office has stopped mentioning Balochistan in its annual report. Why do you think that is the case?
I do not know the reason for that. They may have interests that prompt them not to mention it, but as I said states have interests and means to put pressure on other states to protect their interests. Had the British published the truth, they would have been accused by Pakistan of taking sides. Probably that is why they have chosen not to mention it. But one should ask the foreign office why they have ignored human rights violations in Balochistan.
What is the reality of the accession agreement for the Khanate of Kalat? Did Pakistan go back on the conditions?
There is no annexation agreement. Pakistan was allowed by the British and other world powers to invade Balochistan with the barrel of the gun.
Are you in touch with other Baloch leaders?
I am not only in touch with political leaders but also with tribal chiefs, political activists and the common people of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. It is true that in politics we are as not united as we are in culture and tradition. But we are all united for the independence of Balochistan. We will find ways to address our political differences. A leader who ignores public opinion cannot maintain position as a leader.
You once said you would be willing to accept help even from Israel. Do you still hold that thought?
We accept help from anyone as long as that help is for regaining the independence of Balochistan, including Israel.
Tags

"Independent Balochistan is in India's national interest." Khan of Kalat

  • Prasun Sonwalkar, Hindustan Times, Cardiff
  • Updated: Aug 31, 2016 12:08 IST
Mir Suleman Dawood Jan Ahmedzai, the current holder of the title of “Khan of Kalat”, has welcomed Indian PM Narendra Modi’s “brave and long-awaited” remarks on atrocities allegedly committed in Balochistan by Pakistan. (Prasun Sonwalkar/ HT Photo)

A decade after he left Pakistan and went into self-exile in Britain, the scion of the ruling family of one of the country’s largest princely states says his sole aim is regaining independence for Balochistan, which was annexed at the point of a gun.
Like other Baloch nationalists, Mir Suleman Dawood Jan Ahmedzai, the current holder of the title of “Khan of Kalat”, welcomed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “brave and long-awaited” remarks on atrocities allegedly committed in Balochistan by Pakistan.
Now, he said in an interview with Hindustan Times at his home in a quiet suburb in the capital of Wales, the Baloch people are “looking forward to work with the Indians and others for peace, prosperity and security in south Asia”.
Cooperation between India and the Baloch people, he suggested, could help find a solution to Pakistan’s use of terrorism as a state policy over the past few decades and improve security in the region.
“I have one plan and that is to regain independence for Balochistan, which was annexed by Pakistan at the point of a barrel,” Ahmedzai said.
“He (Modi) will be remembered by the Baloch nation for a long time. I have spoken to a number of tribal chiefs, leaders and people – they are all looking for peace, stability and security,” he said.
“The Baloch, Indian and other nations who have been the victims of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism can together defeat it.”
Elaborating on his expectations from India, Ahmedzai said New Delhi could do “a lot diplomatically” about the rights violation that Modi had spoken about. “India can help us at the UN and at the International Court of Justice. Together with our supporters in the US, we can at least get assets of the leading lights of Pakistan frozen, to begin with,” he said.
“We must explore new ways of cooperation between India and Balochistan. We can help remove the threat to India from its western border,” he added.
The erstwhile Baluchistan Agency composed three princely states, Kalat, Kharan and Las Bela. Kalat was the largest with an area of about 190,000 sq km. The Khanate of Kalat has existed since the 17th century and it was briefly independent between Partition in August 1947 and March 1948.
Kalat acceded to Pakistan in 1948 but the ruling family has contested the accession. It remained a princely state till 1955.
Shortly after leading Baloch nationalist leader Akbar Bugti was killed in a military operation ordered by military ruler Pervez Musharraf in 2006, Ahmedzai left Pakistan after he was reportedly targeted by the security agencies.
Modi’s remarks about rights violations in Balochistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir provoked an angry response from Pakistan, which said he had crossed a “red line”. Islamabad has also said Modi raised Balochistan to divert attention from the unrest in Kashmir, where more than 60 people have died since militant commander Burhan Wani was killed by security forces.
The latest war of words between India and Pakistan has sent ties into a tailspin and New Delhi has said any talks between the two sides should focus on terrorism. Islamabad, however, insists that Kashmir should be the subject of dialogue.
But Ahmedzai said the issue of Balochistan couldn’t be compared to Jammu and Kashmir. “The cynics may say that India will use Balochistan to put pressure on Pakistan to stop sponsoring terrorism in India,” he said.
“But Indian national security and future economic growth is dependent on an independent Balochistan. How? China and Pakistan will surround India if Baloch aspiration for independence is suppressed and if the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is accomplished,” he said.
“I believe Mr Modi is interested in India’s national interest, and an independent Balochistan is in India’s national interest.”
The situation in Balochistan is so bad, Ahmedzai said, that he would even be willing to accept help from Israel for regaining the independence of the province.
“The situation in Balochistan is very bad. There are no accurate estimates but 25,000 people are said to be missing and over a million displaced. Pakistan’s rule over Balochistan has never been legitimate, now it has lost control over Balochistan,” he said. http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/india-can-do-a-lot-modi-will-be-remembered-balochistan-leader-in-self-exile/story-d8VGMH3Pm7nzLyOPLBgKSM.html

Monday, August 8, 2016

The Baloch in Sistan and Baluchistan

Demarking the boundaries of Western Baluchistan – the Goldsmid and Holdich Agreements
Dr. Katona-SCIRHaving occupied Sindh in 1843 and Punjab in 1848, the British extended their influence in Baluchistan. Due to these developments, at the other side, in 1848 in Kerman the Persian Army defeated the Baloch tribes and occupied Bampur. In 1854 a treaty was signed between the British and Naseer Khan, ruler of Kalat whereby the British undertook to pay him an annual sum in return for his acceptance of becoming a British protectorate. Naser Khan II passed away in 1857 and was succeeded by Mir Khodadad who adhered to the above-mentioned agreement with the British in return for the annual payment to be doubled. These developments brought the Persian Empire and Britain face to face in Baluchistan and brought tensions between them. The British intended to extent the Baghdad-Bombay telegraph line westwards from Gwadar to the Straits of Hormuz. Coinciding with these events, there was tension between Persia and the newly revived state of Afghanistan over the province of Sistan. The Afghan Amir Sher Ali Khan asked the British to intervene on behalf of his government.
1n 1870-71 it was agreed that the disputed frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan should be solved through the arbitration of the British. The Persian Government appointed as Commissioner Mirza Masoum Khan, a senior diplomat, and the Government of India assigned, on the presence of the Afghan ruler Amir Sher Ali Khan, Major-General Frederick Goldsmid, Director of the British Telegraph Wire Construction as arbitrator.
The authorities in Bombay suggested involving the Muscat Arabs to the proceedings of Baluchistan boundary arbitration, because they had once leased Gwadar and Chahbahar from the Persian government.
1871 the British-Persian boundary commission concluded on behalf of the Persian Empire to buy its goodwill against the Russian Empire which annexed Central Asia. Panjgur, Parun, Kuhak, Boleida, Nasirabad to the eastward Dash belonged to Kalat, the frontier comprised  Dizzak, Bampusht, Sarbaz, Peshin, Bahu and Dastyari, Sistan Western Makran and Sarhad which belonged to the Persian Empire. The question of Kuhak remained to be settled later. The Persian government did not agree with his decision on the northern section of that line. Kuhak, Esfandak, the Mashkil Valley, the remaining stretch of the frontier areas included a long space as far north as the river of Helmand in Sistan still remained under dispute.
In 1882 a boundary correction let Chahansur to Afghanistan. In 1893 the Durand Commission decided Helmand and Nimroz to join to Afghanistan.
The Persian reasserted their control on Kuhak, which motivated the British to seek delimitation of the still questioned boundaries. On December 27 1895, the two sides agreed in Tehran to demarcate the territories between Kalat and Sistan on the basis of Colonel Holdich’s final report on the proceedings of the Persian-British Baluchistan Frontier Delimitation Commission.
In 1896 the Persian-British border was finalised by the McMohan Commission without obtaining consent from the Khan of Kalat.
Baloch_KhansAfter demarking the Goldsmid and Holdich lines, the Baloch tribes revolted in 1897 in the Sarawan, Bampur and Sarhad regions, led by Hussein Khan Narui. After 1906, when the constitutional movement weakened the central writ, the Baloch took arms again. Bahram Khan occupied Bampur and contacted the German[1] and in 1925 defeated the troops of the British political agent of Makran. On May 7 1916 the British made peace with Bahram Khan and recognized his rule over Western Baluchistan. In the same year the Rigi and Damani tribes revolted against the British also. In 1921 Dost Mohammad Khan, the successor of Bahram Khan allied with the British and ruled the tribal confederation of Western Baluchistan till 1928.
West Baluchistan under the Pahlavi Monarchy
The troops of Reza Khan the new Persian ruler defeated the troops of Khazan Khan, ruler of Khuzestan in 1925 and in 1928 gained victory over the revolt of Dost Mohammad Khan. Independent West Baluchistan was forcibly annexed to Iran by Reza Shah, who created a centralised Persian state. By Harrison the movement of Dost Mohammad was the prototype of Baloch nationalism. [2]
In 1932 the delegation the Baloch of Persia (from 1934 called Iran) participated in the All-Indian Baloch Conference in Jacobabad. Magsi, the chairperson of the conference paid a visit in Sarhad just before the gathering.
Reza Shah took measures to abolish the nomadic pastoral economy, intended to settle the nomads, introduced land register, the pastures which were considered community property before, were registered on the names of the chieftains who moved to urban centres.
Sporadic Baloch revolts accompanied Reza Shah’s rule. In 1931 Barakat Khan of Jashk, in Sarhad Juma Khan Ismailzai and Jiand Khan Yarahmadzai took arms. Their revolts were supressed by air force deployment. The next revolt In 1938 in Kuhak was led by Mehrab Khan Nausherwani. The last uprising was of Mirza Khan in Jashk. These tribal uprisings had local, patrimonic and tribal character and they lacked the modern social base of nation building.
In 1937 from Western Baluchistan the administrative unit of Hokumat-i Makran, then Hokumat-e Baluchistan was formed. The provincial centre Duzzap, was renamed to Zahedan.
The Baloch of Western Baluchistan are nomads with large-range action radius of migration with great livestock crossing regularly for pastures the artificial state borders. The tribal system was preserved among them.
In Iranian Baluchistan in 1957-58 the uprising of Dad Shah, between 1968-75 the Baloch uprising supported by Iraq, developed. That uprising was the first coordinated action of the Baloch nationalists of Iran and Pakistan. Its leaders in exile in Baghdad formed the Baluchistan Liberation Front in 1963. Between 1968-75, their fighters confronted the units of the Iranian Army. After the government of Iraq with the Shah of Iran signed in 1975 the Alger Treaty, Tehran ceased the support of the Kurdish uprising in Iraq, and the Baghdad government ended the support of Baloch nationalists in Iran.
The province first was renamed to Baluchistan and Sistan, and afterwards Sistan and Baluchistan. Under the Pahlavi shahs, there was no education in Baloch language. Sistan and Baluchistan remained the most undeveloped province of Iran.
Sistan and Baluchistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran
Iran has roughly 1,6 million Baloch, comprising about 2 per cent of the total population. There are large Baloch population in Kerman Province as well.
4Sistan and Baluchistan is the country’s most deprived region in modern history. The province has never been included in the country’s comprehensive strategies, has never been a preferred location of industrial investment, hence the lack of jobs. The province’s remoteness from the central planners in Tehran has undermined its potential. Sistan and Baluchistan’s proximity to Pakistan and Afghanistan has turned it into a route of drug trafficking and contraband of firearms and human smuggling.
In Sistan and Baluchistan Province there is the lowest life expectancy, adult literacy, primary school enrolment, access to improved water and sanitation, infant and child mortality. The province has the lowest income in Iran almost 80 per cent of the Baloch are living below the poverty limit. Contrary of the average of 65 per cent in the centre, the rate of literacy was 26 per cent in the province, where less than 5 per cent of the public servants were ethnic Baloch, where ethnic suppression was enshrined. The rate of unemployment is more than 50 per cent.
A significant segment of the population, the Baloch are Sunni Muslims, who are historically suffered from discrimination. Paradoxically, in the early 1980’s the Islamic Republic supported Sunni Islam to quell the growing secular and leftist sentiments of the Baloch. Now the province is full of Shia missionaries seeking to convert the local Sunni population.
In response, from the beginning of the 2000’s, Baloch militant groups emerged. The Jundullah (“The Army of God”), the Jaish Ul-‘Adl (“The Army of Justice”) and Harakat-e Ansar-e Iran (“The Glorious Movement of Iran”) groups are operating in Sistan and Baluchistan Province carrying out attacks against Iranian interests.
Jundullah is also known as Jonbesh-e Muqawamat-e Mardom-e Iran (“Iranian People’s Resistance Movement”), was founded in 2002 to protect the Baloch minority in Iran and started its armed struggle in 2005. The group comprises around 1,000 armed men. Jundullah recruits its fighters largely from Sunni seminaries and militants from the Rigi tribe. Jundullah is a decentralised militant group. Its strategy is to facilitate and train small groups already fighting the Iranian regime. The group attacked on then Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s motorcade in Baluchistan.
Its leader Abdul Malek Rigi and his deputy Abu Hamza were captured in February 2010 on board an aircraft flying from Kyrghizistan to Dubai by the Tehran government. After Rigi’s execution, Jundullah became more violent.
Jundullah does not intend to break away from Iran and to form a separate Baluchistan, its goal to enforce the respect of human rights, culture and faith of the Baloch people. After interacting with the banned radical Pakistani sectarian group, Lashkar-i Jangvi, Rigi adopted its anti-Iranian stance. Through this connection with Lashkar-i Jangvi Rigi went to Zabul Province of Afghanistan but the Afghan Taliban did not deal him for fear that he was connected to U.S. intelligence. In 2009 Rigi met with Al-Qaeda leaders in Turbat district of Pakistani Baluchistan and the Al-Qaeda agreed to support Rigi’s insurgency in Iran in return to facilitate in Iran from Pakistani Baluchistan.[3]
This transformation of Jundullah’s approach resulted the high-profile attacks during with General Noor Ali Sooshtari Deputy Head of Islamic Revolution Guards corps and Rajab Ali Mohammadzadeh, its provincial commander, were assassinated. Jundullah’s leader Maulawi Omar alleges that his group fights for religious and national rights of the Baloch.
In 2012 Jundullah renamed itself Sepah-e Rasulullah (“The Army of the Prophet of Allah”).
Jaish Ul-‘Adl is militant group. Some leaders who left Jundullah, established Jaish Ul-‘Adl. This group is pursuing some goals as Jundullah.
On October 15 2013 its fighters slaughtered fourteen Iranian border guards in Sarawan area. In November 2013 the group shot dead an Iranian prosecutor in Zahedan, facilitated a bomb attack in December 2013 where three Iranian revolutionary guards lost their lives. In February 2014 its fighters captured five Iranian border guards in the Jakigour area of Sistan and Baluchistan.
Harakat-e Ansar-e Iran has bounded its cause with wider Sunni and jihadist cause, created abroad, led by Abu Yasir Muskodani.
Iranian authorities accuse Baloch militant groups operating in Sistan and Baluchistan Province of being supported by the U.S., Britain, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and by militant groups as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The Tehran government accused Washington of secretly funding ethnic groups in Iran to pressure Iran to give up its nuclear programme.
Afghanistan and Pakistan are grounds of proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. While Saudi Arabia supported hard line Sunni groups as Lashkar-e Jangvi, Iran sided with Shiite militant groups as Sepah-i Muhammad. Saudi Arabia funded Sunni groups to create armed resistance in Iran. Saudi intelligence agencies were alleged being behind the abduction of sixteen Iranian police officers from Sarawan region in 2008. It is also rumoured that Jundullah operating from Pakistan. Abdul Malek Rigi was based in Pakistan and carried Pakistani national identity card in the name of Saeed Ahmed.[4]
Balochistan Freedom Rally, Dera Bugti 2008 (12)They are just development of a long-time Iranian-Pakistani rivalry in the Gulf sub-region of the Middle East theatre. But the Iranian Baloch are far from being pro-Pakistan. The frustration of Iran’s Baloch community is reflected in in the armed struggle of their co-ethnics in Pakistani Baluchistan, where some Baloch separatist groups are fighting a nationalist and secular battle against Islamabad in order to gain independence. The mistreatment of the Baloch community on both sides of the border could led to an alliance between religiously motivated anti-Iran Sunni militant groups as Jundullah and the various secular Baloch separatist groups operating in Pakistan, such as the Baloch Liberation Front and the Baloch Liberation Army.
Both Iran and Pakistan cooperated in the past in quelling Baloch nationalist movements and have important economic ties. In February 2014 the governments of Tehran and Islamabad signed a pact sharing responsibility for combating drug traffickers and militants operating across the border and facilitating easier to extradite prisoners. On April 6, 2014 the Iranian parliament passed a bill that paves the way for the Iranian and Pakistani governments to enhance security cooperation.
The Iranian security forces fired a large number of rockets from the Iranian side on the border towns of Panjgur and Mashkil in Pakistani Baluchistan. In 2013 and 2014 the firing of mortars across the border and incursions of Iranian military personnel and violation of Pakistani airspace by Iranian helicopters were reported. Baloch nationalist groups alleged that Tehran is carrying out such operations inside Baluchistan with the support of the Islamabad government as a continuation of their longstanding anti-Baloch operations in the past.
In addition to Iran’s rivalries with the U.S. and Saudi Arabia led Gulf Arab monarchies and the crippling effects on long time economic sanctions imposed on Iran due to its nuclear programme, the resurgence of a Baloch insurgency can strongly impact Iran’s stability and hence that of the entire region. The Iranian Baloch militant groups are a good example how militant groups are exploiting the complicated relations among competing regional states. Furthermore, sectarian violence is an unpredictable menace in Pakistan to increase sectarian tensions in bilateral relations.
Iran is also afraid of the threat of Baloch insurgency poses to its territorial integrity and regional stability. The Tehran government deployed additional security and military units to Sistan and Baluchistan, regularly holds military exercises, coordinates their activities with IRGC, and tightens control of the border, neglects the 1956 agreement of free passage within 60 km depth, constructs wall on the border.
But the grievances of the Baloch are cultural, economic, social, ethnic, and cannot be solved by military force alone. Instead, what is needed is a fair distribution of resources and the intense development of public infrastructure, creating jobs, greater Baloch participation is social affairs.
However, instability in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan Province penetrated by Baloch insurgent groups can scare away potential investors of a delayed Iran-Pakistan pipeline project and can prevent its construction. The free trade port of Chahbahar actually being used as a platform for the transit of goods to Afghanistan and Central Asian markets, have injected some economic life in the region. The central government should expand the province’s transit capacities to benefit from the growing wealth and commercial activities in Central Asian markets. Furthermore, the construction of the Iran-Pakistan pipeline can has generated an economic momentum and could further empower the region to invest in gas-based industries. Caught between armed smuggling and armed insurgency and plagued by underdevelopment, unemployment, and poverty, the province is in dire need of attention of the central government.
References:
[1] HOSSEINBOR, Mohammad Hassan: Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baloch Nationalism, American University Beirut, 1984, 153. P.
[2] HARRISON, Selig: In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York: 1981, 12.p.
[3] SHEHZAD, Syed Saleem: Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11, London: Pluto Press, 2011
[4] ZIA UR-RAHMAN: The Baluch Insurgency: Linking Iran to Pakistan, NOREF (Norvegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre Report, May 2014, https://www.cionet.org/attachments/25296/uploads, Retrieved: 22.07.2016

Dr. Katona was born in Budapest, Hungary. A Member of the Commission of Military Sciences, C.Sc., she has served in various diplomatic posts in Afghanistan and the region. Now she is a Research Fellow at the Strategic Center for International Relations and a member of the Editorial Board of its quarterly publication.

The Afghan Tribune | Dr. Nasrin Katona | Published: August 02, 2016, 04:07 PM

Sunday, July 24, 2016

محراب سرجوی البلوشي - - لقاء خاص Orient News


 Mehrab. Sarjov's interview with Orient T.V;
Director for
The Campaign for independent Baluchistan from Iran interview with Orient T.V
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PSVhDVH4Kho

Monday, July 18, 2016

Rohrabacher Urges VOA Broadcasts to Balochistan

 
Jul 15, 2016
Press Release
WASHINGTON – Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats, called on the overseer of the Voice of America to initiate native-language broadcasting to the Baloch people living in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
The Baloch people occupy homelands that stretch across the borders of the three countries and their “secular, tolerant and liberal tradition is now in danger” of being deprived of access to independent media, said the congressman. The three dominant states, he said, are attempting to create a “single-state identity” – Persian, Punjab, and Pashtun – and impose the values of their respective religious sects.
In a letter to John Lansing, chief executive officer of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Rohrabacher said, “[N]ative language broadcasting could help to provide Baloch with non-biased news and liberal and democratic values. It would also help to preserve Baloch people language and its secular culture.”
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Kenneth Grubbs
Communications Director
Rep. Dana Rohrabacher
Forty-eighth District, California

Sunday, July 3, 2016

Balochistan: Caught in the Fragility Trap

By: 
Ali Dayan Hasan
Although reports indicate an improvement in its overall security, Balochistan remains the most fragile province in contemporary Pakistan. This brief examines both the efficacy and motivations behind the state’s recent actions to end persistent conflict in the province.

Summary

  • The province of Balochistan is riven by multiple cyclical conflicts and is the most fragile in Pakistan.
  • The complicity of politicians, government officials, and security personnel in criminal activity has created a nexus among criminality, militancy, and terrorism.
  • With significant new Chinese investment on the horizon, a tentative but notable shift in state attitudes toward criminality and conflict has occurred. The operational capacity of sectarian militant groups has been degraded, and unprecedented initial steps have been taken to address paramilitary corruption.
  • However, policy realignments continue to be determined primarily by Pakistan’s military establishment in light of its strategic priorities. Political negotiations between the state and Baloch nationalist groups have stalled.
  • While the overall security situation has improved, the rights and needs of Balochistan’s people, and the underlying fault lines that trigger conflict, remain unaddressed. 

    About ths Brief

    Beset by multiple cyclical conflicts, Balochistan remains the most fragile province in Pakistan. This brief discusses recent attempts at ending the violence, as well as prospects for breaking out of the “fragility trap” as a consequence of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project. Ali Dayan Hasan is a senior advisor at the Islamabad-based Jinnah Institute.