By Mehrab. Sarjov,
Iran and Pakistan are united to eliminate the Baluch nation existence from the face of the earth.
1. The world need to understand the conditions that the Iranian Baluch are in, if they want to make sense of the current activities of the Iranian regime and the dilemma it has put Baluch into. The current state of Iran is a multi national state and Shi’ite majority. Baluchistan has been divided in between three states Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan against the Baluch well.
2. However, the Baluch language, culture and sense of nation hood are still alive. Some Baluch still pursue aspirations for a unified Baluch homeland. Iranian occupied Baluchistan populations are a Sunni sect of Islam.
4. Iranian constitutions discriminate against non Shi’ite communities and limit their participation in civil servant jobs and businesses. The Iranian Regime mistrusts Baluch and considers them as British, American and Saudi collaborators.
5. Iran actively encourages Sunni Baluch to change their religion to Shiite sect of Islam. The regime rewards those who are willing to change their religion to Shiite with a job for life. For decades Tehran regime has pursued that to replace indigenous languages and culture, into Persia. But for the last three decade Tehran has pursued the religion change in Baluchistan, in some cases the regime has achieved some success in cites.
6. The regime has faced some tough resistance from some corner of societies. Groups like Jundullah has taken to armed resistance, others have pursued peaceful means to resists religion, and cultural assimilation. They have been jailed on false charges leveled against them, and they have no access to a lawyer. Iran pursues the idea of Persian homogeneity.
7. It has always been accepted that the Iran holds a sizeable Baluch minority. It exists as a distinct, linguistic, and cultural, into the indefinite future. A wide range of justifications have been offered for pursuit of assimilation.
8. What the Baluch in Iran and Pakistan are arguing is that Baluch are a nation with its own homeland, myth, symbol, language, culture and history. With in the Baluchistan camp Baluch can assert that the boundaries that divide Baluchistan in three pieces are colonial boundaries, Baluch nation has never recognized the legitimacy of these boundaries.
9. Persian identity cannot be imposed on the Baluch, the state of Iran is a Shiite empire. Reza Shah has conquered western Baluchistan and incorporated with Persia in 1927.
10. After the 1979 revolution Mulla has extended its religious domination on Baluch that have different school of thought from the Persian majority. Persian has persuaded assimilation policy to subdue the Baluchi in order to create a single Shiite, Persian nation of Iran.
11. Iranian government is a Shiite revolutionary regime, Tehran regime exclude Baluch from sphere of power because they are not the Shiite.
12. There are linguistic, cultures, discrimination, but the religious discrimination is a symbol that unites the Baluch, because assault on the religion by the Shiite is also the assault on the culture. Therefore Baluchi are resisting the Persian cultural and religion and linguistic assimilation and preserving their unique identity.
13. It is well known fact that every social group, of what ever background is prepared to resort to violence in the protection of its dignity and interest.
14. Iran and Pakistan are united to eliminate the Baluch existence from the face of earth. International community has a duty to protect Baloch from genocide just as they protected Kosovo from Serbia. Iran is the Shiite ideological state that has survived the twentieth century, and it is getting more and more difficult for the Iranian people, as well as creating a crisis for the whole world. It has to be contained.
sarjov@hotmail.com.
Pakistan - Terrorist/Failed state
Sunday, November 8, 2009
Thursday, November 5, 2009
Destabilizing Baluchistan, Fracturing Pakistan
Destabilizing Baluchistan, Fracturing Pakistan
The Triangle of Jundallah, the Taliban, and Sipah-e-Sahaba
by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=15858
The Triangle of Jundallah, the Taliban, and Sipah-e-Sahaba
by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=15858
Monday, November 2, 2009
Pakistan's Other Problem Area: Baluchistan
By Ishaan Tharoor
When the world looks at Pakistan, its attention justifiably focuses on the rugged northern border with Afghanistan, a nexus of Taliban activity and the site of an ongoing multi-pronged campaign against the militants. Battling jihadism there is a pivotal plank in the Obama administration's plans to stabilize the war-ravaged region and eventually dial down America's military presence.
But in the shadow of this "Af-Pak" frontier, another conflict has grown new life in recent years and, according to experts, poses a possibly greater existential threat to the Pakistani state. The province of Baluchistan, situated along Pakistan's west and northwest borders with Iran and Afghanistan, comprises more than 40% of Pakistan's landmass but less than 5% of its people. Its unforgiving deserts nearly annihilated the armies of Alexander the Great as they marched home. The native Baluch, descendants of nomadic tribes who roamed these arid wastes, number around five million and have for years complained of marginalization and mistreatment, particularly at the hands of the Pakistani military.
Beneath their homeland's soil lies a treasure trove of natural gas and oil reserves, which, while largely untapped, yield revenues from which the Baluch feel excluded. Successive generations have waged armed rebellions against Pakistani rule — in 1948, 1953, through the 1960s and 70s, and now. According to analysts, continued abuses at the hands of security forces and Pakistan's shadowy intelligence agency, the ISI, have intensified separatist feeling to an unprecedented scale. "Baluch nationalism is more broad-based, is a more serious phenomenon than at any time in the past," says Selig Harrison, director of the Center for International Policy in Washington, a leading authority on the Baluch. (See pictures of Pakistan's vulnerable North-West Frontier Province.)
The dimensions of the Baluch struggle are made all the more complicated by the region's political geography. Around a million ethnic Baluch live on the other side of the border in Iran and there, too, have long agitated against a repressive state for greater freedoms. During Pakistan's most brutal crackdown on Baluch separatists in the 1970s — when civilians reportedly died in the thousands — Iran lent Pakistan logistical support, including helicopters. At the time, the two countries were allied together under the U.S.-led CENTO Cold War pact, but following Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979 relations changed, with Tehran's Shia establishment increasingly wary of their Sunni counterparts in the Pakistani military leadership. The Iranians loath the Afghan Taliban, who were created in part by elements within the Pakistani state. "There's an inherent set of tensions [between the two countries] based on their prior strategic choices," says Sameer Lalwani, a Pakistan watcher at the New America Foundation, a Washington-based think tank.
On Baluchistan, the cooperation of old has shifted to a more guarded mutual distrust. On Oct. 18, Jundullah, a Baluch militia based on Pakistani soil struck the Iranian border city of Pishin, killing 41, including a number of senior figures in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. A week later, Pakistani troops detained 11 Iranian agents who had infiltrated across the border, possibly in a mission aimed against Jundullah. They were eventually released, but the incidents spotlighted the uncomfortable place Baluchistan occupies in both Tehran and Islamabad's internal affairs — and their dealings with each other.
These tensions may balloon in the future as other regional powers expand their interests in Baluchistan as well. The presence of some 19 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the province has raised the prospect of significant outside investment, but it has only deepened Baluch anxieties of alienation. China has already set about securing access to Baluchistan's other rich veins of resources: it owns a controlling interest in the massive gold and copper mine at Saindak and has steered the building of a $1 billion blue water port at Gwadar, mostly using Chinese labor. The growing hub of Gwadar, which Islamabad has slated to become a special economic zone, is not only a focal point of Chinese strategic interests in southwest Asia, but also a source of contention for the Baluch, who have been almost entirely frozen out of its development and, as in elsewhere in the province, kept at arm's length by ethnic Punjabis and Sindhis arriving to do business here from other parts of Pakistan.
Baluch separatists claim that they never wanted to be part of Britain's partitioning of colonial India into the independent states of India and Pakistan and that they are the victims of an empire that barely ruled them. The border that splits Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistan was a line plotted in 1871 by a British colonial official, ceding territory to Iran's rulers in a bid to win Tehran's support against Czarist Russia. Now, the Baluch in Pakistan and Iran who fear independence may be out of reach campaign for expanded freedoms and guarantees to preserve their language and culture within the Pakistani and Iranian states. Others have taken arms over the years. Suggestions made by some Pakistani officials linking Baluch separatism to the activities of the Taliban are wrong, says Harrison. Baluch nationalism has always been a secular project; its militant fronts warring with Pakistan, like the Baluch Liberation Army, descend from a tradition of Marxist-Leninist guerrillas that took root in the 1970s. Jundullah, though an avowedly Sunni group, articulates its identity as a rejection of the Shia clerics ruling Iran — a political act — rather than one born out any particular fervor.
When trying to discredit Baluch separatism, Islamabad often blames its regional rival, India, for abetting and influencing the rebels. Pakistan's wariness of India's hand in its affairs has only grown after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan saw Indian engagement there bloom — Pakistani officials say Indian consulates in the Afghan cities of Kandahar and Jalalabad are behind the destabilizing acts of subversion in Baluchistan. Baluch attacks are frequently followed by Pakistani accusations of Indian involvement, though Islamabad, which has a noted record of being a breeding ground for terrorists who make their way to India, has yet to show any evidence of Indian collusion. Earlier this month, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh rejected any notion of India backing insurgents. "The people and government of Pakistan know jolly well that this is a false accusation," said Singh.
Meanwhile, Baluchistan simmers. Beyond the standard detachments of border troops, the Pakistani military has kept an occupying army in six major garrisons across the province since 1958. For decades, the Baluch have accused the army of kidnappings, disappearances and extrajudicial killings. In April, three dissident Baluch leaders were reportedly abducted by Pakistani security forces and found days later, their bodies bruised and ridden with bullets, triggering weeks of rioting and violence. A 2008 Amnesty International report, "Denying the Undeniable: Enforced Disappearances in Pakistan," charted at least 600 unresolved disappearances in Baluchistan alone. The 2006 killing of Akbar Bugti — at the time, the emotive figurehead of Baluch separatism — in a firefight with Pakistani troops gave the current wave of Baluch nationalists a martyred hero to latch onto. "The continued atrocities all over Pakistani Baluchistan has kindled a very strong separatist feeling that will have to be answered," says Harrison of the Center for International Policy.
In a report published earlier this year, Harrison recommends the withdrawal of a chunk of the Pakistani occupying army and a political solution that grants the province greater autonomy and control over its resources. The Baluch desire for greater autonomy commands a decent level of sympathy among the Pakistani public, but is a non-starter with the military, who view the province as a vital geopolitical bulwark against Tehran, Kabul or New Delhi's interests. The political paralysis in dealing with this remote, restive province is another sign, experts say, of the real power the military holds over the country's weak civilian government. "[Pakistani President Asif ]Zardari and his entourage understand what needs to be done," says Harrison. "But they have no ability to get the armed forces and the ISI to cooperate."
The U.S. has remained mostly quiet on the matter, in part because it only has so much leverage that it can wield over the Pakistani military. During the Bush administration, there were suggestions that Washington was even secretly backing anti-Iranian groups like Jundullah and staging covert operations against Iran from Baluchistan. But a more public effort to reach a just solution for Baluch grievances would go a long way toward securing stability for Pakistan in general. The Baluch disturbances have put on hold plans to build a lucrative gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan — a link that would enhance regional cooperation as well as boost the nation's wealth. Calming separatist passions would also serve as a lesson to the Pakistani military, which, as seen during the traumatic and bloody independence of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), has a habit of trying to brutally stomp out secessionist movements. At a moment when there are so many hearts and minds to be won — and boots on the ground stretched so thin — it wouldn't hurt to give peace a chance.
When the world looks at Pakistan, its attention justifiably focuses on the rugged northern border with Afghanistan, a nexus of Taliban activity and the site of an ongoing multi-pronged campaign against the militants. Battling jihadism there is a pivotal plank in the Obama administration's plans to stabilize the war-ravaged region and eventually dial down America's military presence.
But in the shadow of this "Af-Pak" frontier, another conflict has grown new life in recent years and, according to experts, poses a possibly greater existential threat to the Pakistani state. The province of Baluchistan, situated along Pakistan's west and northwest borders with Iran and Afghanistan, comprises more than 40% of Pakistan's landmass but less than 5% of its people. Its unforgiving deserts nearly annihilated the armies of Alexander the Great as they marched home. The native Baluch, descendants of nomadic tribes who roamed these arid wastes, number around five million and have for years complained of marginalization and mistreatment, particularly at the hands of the Pakistani military.
Beneath their homeland's soil lies a treasure trove of natural gas and oil reserves, which, while largely untapped, yield revenues from which the Baluch feel excluded. Successive generations have waged armed rebellions against Pakistani rule — in 1948, 1953, through the 1960s and 70s, and now. According to analysts, continued abuses at the hands of security forces and Pakistan's shadowy intelligence agency, the ISI, have intensified separatist feeling to an unprecedented scale. "Baluch nationalism is more broad-based, is a more serious phenomenon than at any time in the past," says Selig Harrison, director of the Center for International Policy in Washington, a leading authority on the Baluch. (See pictures of Pakistan's vulnerable North-West Frontier Province.)
The dimensions of the Baluch struggle are made all the more complicated by the region's political geography. Around a million ethnic Baluch live on the other side of the border in Iran and there, too, have long agitated against a repressive state for greater freedoms. During Pakistan's most brutal crackdown on Baluch separatists in the 1970s — when civilians reportedly died in the thousands — Iran lent Pakistan logistical support, including helicopters. At the time, the two countries were allied together under the U.S.-led CENTO Cold War pact, but following Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979 relations changed, with Tehran's Shia establishment increasingly wary of their Sunni counterparts in the Pakistani military leadership. The Iranians loath the Afghan Taliban, who were created in part by elements within the Pakistani state. "There's an inherent set of tensions [between the two countries] based on their prior strategic choices," says Sameer Lalwani, a Pakistan watcher at the New America Foundation, a Washington-based think tank.
On Baluchistan, the cooperation of old has shifted to a more guarded mutual distrust. On Oct. 18, Jundullah, a Baluch militia based on Pakistani soil struck the Iranian border city of Pishin, killing 41, including a number of senior figures in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. A week later, Pakistani troops detained 11 Iranian agents who had infiltrated across the border, possibly in a mission aimed against Jundullah. They were eventually released, but the incidents spotlighted the uncomfortable place Baluchistan occupies in both Tehran and Islamabad's internal affairs — and their dealings with each other.
These tensions may balloon in the future as other regional powers expand their interests in Baluchistan as well. The presence of some 19 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the province has raised the prospect of significant outside investment, but it has only deepened Baluch anxieties of alienation. China has already set about securing access to Baluchistan's other rich veins of resources: it owns a controlling interest in the massive gold and copper mine at Saindak and has steered the building of a $1 billion blue water port at Gwadar, mostly using Chinese labor. The growing hub of Gwadar, which Islamabad has slated to become a special economic zone, is not only a focal point of Chinese strategic interests in southwest Asia, but also a source of contention for the Baluch, who have been almost entirely frozen out of its development and, as in elsewhere in the province, kept at arm's length by ethnic Punjabis and Sindhis arriving to do business here from other parts of Pakistan.
Baluch separatists claim that they never wanted to be part of Britain's partitioning of colonial India into the independent states of India and Pakistan and that they are the victims of an empire that barely ruled them. The border that splits Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistan was a line plotted in 1871 by a British colonial official, ceding territory to Iran's rulers in a bid to win Tehran's support against Czarist Russia. Now, the Baluch in Pakistan and Iran who fear independence may be out of reach campaign for expanded freedoms and guarantees to preserve their language and culture within the Pakistani and Iranian states. Others have taken arms over the years. Suggestions made by some Pakistani officials linking Baluch separatism to the activities of the Taliban are wrong, says Harrison. Baluch nationalism has always been a secular project; its militant fronts warring with Pakistan, like the Baluch Liberation Army, descend from a tradition of Marxist-Leninist guerrillas that took root in the 1970s. Jundullah, though an avowedly Sunni group, articulates its identity as a rejection of the Shia clerics ruling Iran — a political act — rather than one born out any particular fervor.
When trying to discredit Baluch separatism, Islamabad often blames its regional rival, India, for abetting and influencing the rebels. Pakistan's wariness of India's hand in its affairs has only grown after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan saw Indian engagement there bloom — Pakistani officials say Indian consulates in the Afghan cities of Kandahar and Jalalabad are behind the destabilizing acts of subversion in Baluchistan. Baluch attacks are frequently followed by Pakistani accusations of Indian involvement, though Islamabad, which has a noted record of being a breeding ground for terrorists who make their way to India, has yet to show any evidence of Indian collusion. Earlier this month, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh rejected any notion of India backing insurgents. "The people and government of Pakistan know jolly well that this is a false accusation," said Singh.
Meanwhile, Baluchistan simmers. Beyond the standard detachments of border troops, the Pakistani military has kept an occupying army in six major garrisons across the province since 1958. For decades, the Baluch have accused the army of kidnappings, disappearances and extrajudicial killings. In April, three dissident Baluch leaders were reportedly abducted by Pakistani security forces and found days later, their bodies bruised and ridden with bullets, triggering weeks of rioting and violence. A 2008 Amnesty International report, "Denying the Undeniable: Enforced Disappearances in Pakistan," charted at least 600 unresolved disappearances in Baluchistan alone. The 2006 killing of Akbar Bugti — at the time, the emotive figurehead of Baluch separatism — in a firefight with Pakistani troops gave the current wave of Baluch nationalists a martyred hero to latch onto. "The continued atrocities all over Pakistani Baluchistan has kindled a very strong separatist feeling that will have to be answered," says Harrison of the Center for International Policy.
In a report published earlier this year, Harrison recommends the withdrawal of a chunk of the Pakistani occupying army and a political solution that grants the province greater autonomy and control over its resources. The Baluch desire for greater autonomy commands a decent level of sympathy among the Pakistani public, but is a non-starter with the military, who view the province as a vital geopolitical bulwark against Tehran, Kabul or New Delhi's interests. The political paralysis in dealing with this remote, restive province is another sign, experts say, of the real power the military holds over the country's weak civilian government. "[Pakistani President Asif ]Zardari and his entourage understand what needs to be done," says Harrison. "But they have no ability to get the armed forces and the ISI to cooperate."
The U.S. has remained mostly quiet on the matter, in part because it only has so much leverage that it can wield over the Pakistani military. During the Bush administration, there were suggestions that Washington was even secretly backing anti-Iranian groups like Jundullah and staging covert operations against Iran from Baluchistan. But a more public effort to reach a just solution for Baluch grievances would go a long way toward securing stability for Pakistan in general. The Baluch disturbances have put on hold plans to build a lucrative gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan — a link that would enhance regional cooperation as well as boost the nation's wealth. Calming separatist passions would also serve as a lesson to the Pakistani military, which, as seen during the traumatic and bloody independence of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), has a habit of trying to brutally stomp out secessionist movements. At a moment when there are so many hearts and minds to be won — and boots on the ground stretched so thin — it wouldn't hurt to give peace a chance.
Friday, October 23, 2009
The Destabilization of Pakistan
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7705
by Prof. Michel Chossudovsky
Pakistan's Oil and Gas reserves
Pakistan has an estimated 25.1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven gas reserves of which 19 trillion are located in Balochistan. Among foreign oil and gas contractors in Balochistan are BP, Italy's ENI, Austria's OMV, and Australia's BHP. It is worth noting that Pakistan's State oil and gas companies, including PPL which has the largest stake in the Sui oil fields of Balochistan are up for privatization under IMF-World Bank supervision.
A new political leadership is anticipated but in all likelihood it will take on a very different shape, in relation to previous US sponsored regimes. One can expect that Washington will push for a compliant political leadership, with no commitment to the national interest, a leadership which will serve US imperial interests, while concurrently contributing under the disguise of "decentralization", to the weakening of the central government and the fracture of Pakistan's fragile federal structure.
The Balkanization of Pakistan
Already in 2005, a report by the US National Intelligence Council and the CIA forecast a "Yugoslav-like fate" for Pakistan "in a decade with the country riven by civil war, bloodshed and inter-provincial rivalries, as seen recently in Balochistan." (Energy Compass, 2 March 2005). According to the NIC-CIA, Pakistan is slated to become a "failed state" by 2015, "as it would be affected by civil war, complete Talibanisation and struggle for control of its nuclear weapons". (Quoted by former Pakistan High Commissioner to UK, Wajid Shamsul Hasan, Times of India, 13 February 2005):
Part Two: Pakistan and the "Global War on Terrorism" at http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7746]
by Prof. Michel Chossudovsky
Pakistan's Oil and Gas reserves
Pakistan has an estimated 25.1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven gas reserves of which 19 trillion are located in Balochistan. Among foreign oil and gas contractors in Balochistan are BP, Italy's ENI, Austria's OMV, and Australia's BHP. It is worth noting that Pakistan's State oil and gas companies, including PPL which has the largest stake in the Sui oil fields of Balochistan are up for privatization under IMF-World Bank supervision.
A new political leadership is anticipated but in all likelihood it will take on a very different shape, in relation to previous US sponsored regimes. One can expect that Washington will push for a compliant political leadership, with no commitment to the national interest, a leadership which will serve US imperial interests, while concurrently contributing under the disguise of "decentralization", to the weakening of the central government and the fracture of Pakistan's fragile federal structure.
The Balkanization of Pakistan
Already in 2005, a report by the US National Intelligence Council and the CIA forecast a "Yugoslav-like fate" for Pakistan "in a decade with the country riven by civil war, bloodshed and inter-provincial rivalries, as seen recently in Balochistan." (Energy Compass, 2 March 2005). According to the NIC-CIA, Pakistan is slated to become a "failed state" by 2015, "as it would be affected by civil war, complete Talibanisation and struggle for control of its nuclear weapons". (Quoted by former Pakistan High Commissioner to UK, Wajid Shamsul Hasan, Times of India, 13 February 2005):
Part Two: Pakistan and the "Global War on Terrorism" at http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7746]
The House version of the Kerry-Lugar Bill explicitly recognized the situation in Sindh and Balochistan, and the need for the US to support the rights of these peoples
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h1886/text?version=ih&nid=t0:ih:4
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h1886/text?version=ih&nid=t0:ih:4
Wednesday, October 7, 2009
Assimilation is not the answer.
It is essential for Pakistan and Iran to find a way that would weaken the capacity of Baluch to challenge Iran and Pakistan, domestically or internationally. That means denying Baluch any international standing and undermining the domestic institution basis on which Baluch had historically sustained themselves as cohesive community and organized to contest for state power. I do not believe, the Sardari system is a democratic system or one can organize a modern system around it. But assimilation is not the answer.
Anti-sardar rhetoric would not give Baluch what they need to be able to maintain their languages and culture, and national sovereignty.
Without independent Baluchistan’s millenniums year’s old communities and Baluch culture, language would not be able to resist Persian and Pakistani national building and assimilations policies.
Sardar is an institution that unites and protects tribe, tribesmen jealously guard their territory and members, Tribesmen select their Sardar. There are advantages and disadvantages in every system of government. An ash has no value; do not burn your shelter.
M.sarjov
Anti-sardar rhetoric would not give Baluch what they need to be able to maintain their languages and culture, and national sovereignty.
Without independent Baluchistan’s millenniums year’s old communities and Baluch culture, language would not be able to resist Persian and Pakistani national building and assimilations policies.
Sardar is an institution that unites and protects tribe, tribesmen jealously guard their territory and members, Tribesmen select their Sardar. There are advantages and disadvantages in every system of government. An ash has no value; do not burn your shelter.
M.sarjov
Monday, October 5, 2009
The Norwegian government is failing Ehsan Arjmand.
If Pakistani have extradited Ehsan Arjmandi to the Iranian authority, if it is a true story that would be heart breaking news for those concerned for Ehsan’s wellbeing.
Ehsan Arjmandi is a Norwegian national, he has a valid Pakistani visa and he went missing while travelling around Pakistan, allegedly he has been picked up by ISI. Pakistani Embassy has issued a visa to Ehsan, if he is a threat to the state; Pakistani ambassador should have not issued him the visa. I believe Ehsan does not have valid Iranian documents, Pakistan cannot extradite him to Iran legally, he is not Iranian he is a Norwegian national and he has committed no crimes in Iran.
The Norwegian state should be more concerned than anyone else that one of her citizens has been sold to Iranian intelligence by Pakistan. The Norwegian government doesn’t need reminders to perform her duty, which is to protect Norwegian citizens. The Norwegian government has a moral duty to intervene. One of her citizens is missing inside Pakistan; there are eyes witness reports that suggest he has been abducted by the state agencies.
Ehsan’s case deserves investigation by Pakistan authority to the satisfaction of Ehsan’s family. The Norwegian government should be doing something to recover Ehsan Arjmandi from the Pakistani intelligence.
If he has been handed over to Iran, in my opinion the Norwegian government is failing Ehsan Arjmand.
Sarjov.
Ehsan Arjmandi is a Norwegian national, he has a valid Pakistani visa and he went missing while travelling around Pakistan, allegedly he has been picked up by ISI. Pakistani Embassy has issued a visa to Ehsan, if he is a threat to the state; Pakistani ambassador should have not issued him the visa. I believe Ehsan does not have valid Iranian documents, Pakistan cannot extradite him to Iran legally, he is not Iranian he is a Norwegian national and he has committed no crimes in Iran.
The Norwegian state should be more concerned than anyone else that one of her citizens has been sold to Iranian intelligence by Pakistan. The Norwegian government doesn’t need reminders to perform her duty, which is to protect Norwegian citizens. The Norwegian government has a moral duty to intervene. One of her citizens is missing inside Pakistan; there are eyes witness reports that suggest he has been abducted by the state agencies.
Ehsan’s case deserves investigation by Pakistan authority to the satisfaction of Ehsan’s family. The Norwegian government should be doing something to recover Ehsan Arjmandi from the Pakistani intelligence.
If he has been handed over to Iran, in my opinion the Norwegian government is failing Ehsan Arjmand.
Sarjov.
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