Saturday, January 6, 2018

Why so called secular parties subordinating themselves under Mullahs!



As a Baluch activist with a vision for an independent Baluchistan I have lots of respect for religion, Mosque and Mullahs. Religion can be a National identity or shape a part of national identity. So far the Mullahs in Iranian occupied Baluchistan have always acted as anti-nationalism in favour of Ummah.
 I believe the Shiite religious rule over Iran has damaged clergies’ (Mullahs) credibility. The Sunni clergies in Baluchistan, from the beginning, have been willing partners of Shiite rulers. Some of them took part in 1980’s book burning and so forth. They may not have had executive powers but they are the only group which has had their influence increased under this regime.
I think it’s time for Baluch politician, Baluchistan political parties, in western Baluchistan particularly those groups or parties claiming to be secular, not to subordinate themselves under Mullahs.
What kind of secular are they?
Are their claims to secularism is only to fool western democracy.  Why so called secular parties subordinating themselves under Mullahs! The Sunni religious clergies (Mullahs) have been loyal to the Persian- Shiite dominated Iran!  Probably Baluch secular parties are the party of the wind under the moon.

Mehrab. Sarjov is a Baluch political activist based in London and campaign for an independent Baluchistan

Sunday, December 17, 2017

Iran is fast becoming a failing State



Iran survived as a State because of a historical accident and protection from the international norm that the member of the United Nations provide legitimacy to each other. The international norm Iran violated has benefited Iran enormously.


The failed states pose a great threat to the World. The American led states have been trying to prevent states from becoming failed States. The Afghanistan and Iraq and Yemen have shown that the State building is not cheap, it’s take time and need money. The Iranian meddling in Middle East and its unswerving support has been a challenge for the American world order.


Iran’s State structure is based on the coercive structure without proper institutions and little legitimacy to hold on to, so with little effort from within the state will collapse. Iran appear to be strong in term of destructive power and influence and control over many terrorist organisations but a falling state in terms of delivering good and services, protection of its citizen and their rights.


A strong army cannot prevent state or resuscitate failed states. Iraq is a wealthy country and in the recent past, had a strong army but Iraq failed to create a constitution and build institutions according to the state’s diverse population need and normalise the rule of law.

Iran as a State is not much different from Iraq under Saddam Hussain rule. Iran has without doubt a Strong paramilitary forces with guerrilla warfare capacity.

Iran is not capable to deliver goods and services to its citizen on scale they do not to undermine the legitimacy of the State. State failure arise when the majority of people are denied opportunities for political participation in the political process which effect their daily lives.

 Iran is no longer capable to arbitrate disputes between citizens and diverse ethnic groups competing for the control of state’s resources, provision of economic infrastructures and provide security to citizens.

Iran has always been governed by a colt like leader from centre (Tehran).  A number of weakness start to delegitimise the State. Disharmony, in some cases conflicts, between communities, Ethnic groups and State failure to control, in some case the State takes side and aggravate the conflicts. Crime is rewarded, the State borders are maintained by Criminal on behalf the State. The growth of criminal violence, rotten infrastructure and corrupt institutions.


In addition the arbitrary post-colonial borders, lack of democracy, widespread of unemployment and poverty and Iran’s dependent on terrorists organisations as a tool for influence in the foreign countries also Iran has been using the foreign terrorists to suppress its own citizens. The majority of Baluch, Arab and Kurd population reached a point that they are not willing to accept Persian rule and decision. Iran is fast becoming a failing State.

Mehrab Sarjov is a Baluch political activist based in London and campaign for an independent Baluchistan

Thursday, October 26, 2017

A PROTEST WILL BE HELD at THE CUMBERLAND HOTEL, MARBLE ARCH on organised by The Baluch Community UK.

A PROTEST WILL BE HELD On Sunday 29th October from 11am till 3pm at THE CUMBERLAND HOTEL, MARBLE ARCH  organised by The Baluch Community UK.

A plan is to be put forward there on 28th & 29 October 2017 promoting the creation of “The First Chinese Master Community in Pakistan” at Gwadar with the help from Punjabi dominated Pakistan! The first Chinese half billion US dollars colonisation project in Baluchistan.

You are whole heartedly encouraged to attend Sunday 29th October outside Cumberland Hotel to register your opposition against this forced colonisation - “China Pak Hill, Gwadar”. YOUR VOICE CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE.

Baluch are killed or kidnapped by Pakistan security forces in Gwadar and Baluchistan every day.

The government of Pakistan is seizing Baluch land in Gwadar and other fertile areas on the CEPC route.

The Pakistani State is denying the Baluch the basic necessities to live a dignified life - security, clean water, education, right to work and  dignity. The Baluch are being forcefully removed from their ancestral homes by the State. Pakistanis are selling confiscated Baluch lands to The Chinese Communist Party which has already completed a navy and military post on the Mukran shore.

For the sakes of our people and and children PLEASE attend Sunday 29th October outside Cumberland Hotel to register your opposition against this forced colonisation - “China Pak Hill, Gwadar”. YOUR VOICE CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE.

The Baluch Community UK.

Friday, October 6, 2017

OUT OF AFGHANISTAN?

To defeat the Islamists in Afghanistan, we should learn how to divide and rule. We must pursue a number of policies that may seem contradictory. First, we should strengthen the royalists, the republicans, and the nationalists not just at the center in Kabul but in the areas where they enjoy the most support: among the ethnic groups, tribes, and clans. Setting the tribes against one another and against various Islamic radicals, reformers, and nationalists formed the basis of Britain’s colonial policy in Afghanistan. Self-paralysis of the Afghans meant safety for the Empire’s policy there. Missing from my list is the liberal democratic orientation as it is naturally absent at this stage of Afghanistan’s development. First things first. We should get rid of the Islamists and, ideally, restore a modernizing monarchy. Then other good things will follow. Inshallah.
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By Marek Jan Chodakiewicz l June 27, 2017
“America’s longest war” cries out for a suggestion of a way out. Here’s one. Let us use non-jihadi Muslims to eliminate the Islamist jihadis. This would entail enabling forces at local, regional, and national levels inimical to the ideology and practice of Islamism. We can deploy this strategy successfully if we realize that the Islamists are interested primarily in the control of the state, in particular at the moment the Taliban, mostly Pashtun, radicalized in Saudi funded Wahhabi madrasas of the Pakistani refugee camps, and their Al Queda and related allies and enablers. Their detractors either compete with them for the command of the state or are suspicious and even inimical to it. This reality is quite obscured by the current convergence of most Afghani forces in the jihadist camp, which reflects not so much the Islamist predilections of most of the contenders but the persistence of Afghanistan’s ongoing holy war, the jihad.
No Reason for Jihad
Practically the only way to put paid to jihad in Afghanistan is for non-Muslim foreigners to leave. Then the Afghans take care of themselves, i.e., the theological grounds for jihad are no more; they simply fight among themselves until a viable power configuration emerges. Sometimes it is a king; sometimes it is a religious order (e.g., Sufi or Taliban); and most of the time a collection of warlords bound by a tacit agreement of a love-hate relationship: you leave my dominion alone, and I shall do the same for you. Usually, it is a combination of above factors. This is what the history of Afghanistan suggests.
Theoretically, of course, one could disagree with the lessons of the past and conjure up an a priori, abstract solution. For example, let us suggest stopping the jihadis by democide: killing all Muslims there. Why such an extreme solution? The jihadis are like fish; they need an ocean to swim in. Even if the Muslim ocean does not share the political goals of the Islamists, it shelters them or, at least, it allows them to camouflage themselves within its depths. They draw strength from among its elements; and they are a part of its Muslim cultural aura, a segment of an all-embracing community, the umma, joined by the universalism of the sharia. Therefore, barring legitimate concerns about the radioactive fallout, a nuclear holocaust would be probably the most efficient way to get rid of the jihadis. The by-product would be unfortunately a mass murder of the inhabitants of Afghanistan. Hopefully, this Swiftian provocation has you riveted now.
Terrorists or Muslims?
Since we are neither Nazis nor Communists, we not only refuse to consider such an apocalyptic option, but we are indeed repulsed by it. Yet, both Muslims and non-Muslims continue to harbor a perception that all within the umma essentially appear as one: Muslims. That includes the Islamists. It is mostly an unspoken presumption of a majority of the non-Muslims. Publicly, we declare something different altogether, however. Political correctness dictates that we insist that the Islamists, Salafist, Jihadists, and Caliphatists are “not true Muslims.” They allegedly have nothing to do with Islam. Yet, if Islam enjoys no central authority and it is divided into myriad sects and mutations within both the Sunni and Shia orientations, then what is the orthodoxy here?
Who decides who is orthodox? Indeed, who is orthodox? Why would your imam, alim, or pir be better than mine? This, incidentally, is the grounds for the persistent civil war within Islam, a sanguinary conflict that has raged since the death of their Prophet Mohammed in the 7th century.
Other than a nuclear strike or wishful thinking, is there a way to separate the wheat from the chaff? Can we distill the non-jihadi Muslims from the jihadists? Yes, we can, but we must first leave Afghanistan so as to remove the conditions for the persistence of the jihad. Once we are invisible there, we can manipulate the situation, directly and indirectly, with the help of our special forces, intelligence operators, select diplomats and their native collaborators at the local, regional, and national level. In other words, we can get the Muslims to fight other Muslims.
Muslim Collaborators
Aside from the usual suspects eager for our money, there will be also others. Likewise, happy to accept our funds, rather than out of mercenary motives only, those collaborators will share our animosity toward the Islamists. There are at least nine kinds of potential collaborators we can enlist.
First, the dissident Islamists have quarreled with the mainstream, dominant Islamists. Usually, the split stems from some tactical differences and, even more often, the personalities of their leaders. Second, there will be minority Islamists, who resent the mainstream Islamists for tribal reasons (e.g., Uzbek vs. Pashtun or Baluch vs. foreign fighter multi-ethnic Islamists). Sometimes the first and second categories of dissident/minority Islamist overlap.
The third group of enemies of the Salafists are the royalists, who also vie with them for the control of the state. The royalists tend to be allied with the fourth group, the traditional aristocracy, previously strong in the countryside, which, however, like the monarchists, were greatly weakened under the Soviet and native-Communist rule. Fifth, secular republicans and post-Communists, both post-Stalinists and post-Maoist, would like to seize the command of the state to introduce their brand of modernization in opposition to the Islamists. In particular, nationalism in any form (including military socialism or national bolshevism) is a grave challenge to Islamism.
The Tribal and Traditional
Then, sixth, there are plenty of non-Pashtun ethnic groups who, during the Soviet occupation either developed a distinct identity or greatly strengthened it. They oppose not only the traditional political leadership, which, whether monarchist, republican, or post-Communist, tended to be Pashtun. For similar, tribal reasons, the minority ethnic groups also oppose the Islamists. The non-Pashtuns fear centralization and, hence, the state. They enjoy the self-sufficiency or, at least, neglect bred by the war and disorder.
Paradoxically, seventh, the majority Pashtun can be turned against the jihadis, if the former continue to adhere to the tribal model. In fact, re-tribalization is the key to weaning the Pashtuns away from the Taliban and other jihadis. This is because tribal law and custom, in particular Pashtunwali, are particularist devices that tend to override in everyday importance the universalism of the sharia.
Eight, the strengthening or the restoration of traditional social structures at the local level shall weaken the Islamists. There are the maliks and khans, provincial officials, village elders, and community mediators between the local population and the state bureaucracy. Each prominent man in his locality takes care of his immediate social group (qawm). According to astute French scholar Olivier Roy, qawm is a “communal group, whose sociological basis may vary. It may be a clan (in tribal zones), a village, an ethnic group, an extended family, [or] a professional group.”
The Qawm
In many instances, the roles of the local civilian leaders were appropriated by lower level Mujahedeen commanders already during the Soviet occupation. They are jealous of their new/old prerogatives and want to retain them. They will resist any regime that should attempt to reduce or eliminate their power by either restoring the old system or by introducing a new one that would exclude them.
Where the khans and maliks survived or returned to reclaim their role of running and representing the qawm, they display similar attitudes toward the state. They will cooperate only if they are sufficiently bribed by Kabul without permitting serious expansion of the state influence in their bailiwicks. They also resent any universalist intrusions into their particular environment, and that includes by any ideology, the Islamist one for example. In fact, ideologies, like anything modern, are usually associated with urban life and greatly mistrusted in the countryside.
Further, the khans and maliks tolerate and countenance basic religious services by their local, unversed mullahs, whose social standing is rather low. However, the local leaders are rather suspicious of the educated ulema, the scholars of law, who tend to originate from towns, with their universalist message of the sharia, if their interloping is perceived to threaten the particularism of the qawm and its local custom.
Fundamentalists vs Islamists?
And, ninth, perhaps shockingly and counterintuitively for some, the fundamentalists can be enemies of the Islamists. The fundamentalists are the traditional ulema, the scholars of law. The fundamentalists can also be Sufi masters (pir), who may or may not be also simultaneously ulema. Although they usually share many features in common with the Islamists, including chiefly their insistence on the primacy of the sharia, the fundamentalists are not primarily focused on the state but, instead, they are interested in the Muslim community (umma). They are rather content, if they are left in charge of the community and if the state does not interfere with their fundamentalist grip on the community. If the state eschews regulating the non-governmental dimension of the society, the ulema are happy to develop a modus vivendi and even to bless the regime periodically.
They prefer for the state to be ruled by a pious ruler, but they can live with a less than perfect sovereign, or even an indifferent leader, who does not stray actively too far away from Islam. The ulema detest atheists and apostates in power, but they also hate Muslim intellectuals, who usurp the prerogatives of the traditional, fundamentalist ulema.
And many leading Islamists are not of the ulema. They tend to be intellectuals: engineers, doctors, and others, who have taken up Islam as their vehicle to square their Muslim identity with the requirements of modernity and the challenges of the West stemming from it. The ulema usually hate modernity as predicated on innovation (Arabic: bid’ah, Urdu: bidat). And innovation is a sin (haram). Thus, essentially, for the fundamentalist ulema the Islamists can be haram. The scholars of law and other fundamentalist leaders can be prevailed upon to issue appropriate damning rulings (fatwa) against the Islamists.
Political Warfare
We have our work cut out for us. We have political warfare to do. To defeat the Islamists in Afghanistan, we should learn how to divide and rule. We must pursue a number of policies that may seem contradictory. First, we should strengthen the royalists, the republicans, and the nationalists not just at the center in Kabul but in the areas where they enjoy the most support: among the ethnic groups, tribes, and clans. We should observe which orientation turns most viable and allocate more resources its way.
Meanwhile, at the lowest level, we should re-tribalize by strengthening the tribes, the clans, and, especially, the qawm. We can also enable the ulema against the Islamists by assisting fundamentalist madrasasribat, and other centers based on the Afghan tradition (e.g., Hanafi vs Hanbali law schools; and Sufi vs. Wahhabi sects). That would entail countering the Saudi influence: both state and private (religious tax driven – [zakat]). In other words, we should encourage hyper-plurality.
All this should be a no-brainer. Setting the tribes against one another and against various Islamic radicals, reformers, and nationalists formed the basis of Britain’s colonial policy in Afghanistan. Self-paralysis of the Afghans meant safety for the Empire’s policy there.
Before the neo-conservatives raise a ruckus, I admit freely: Missing from my list is the liberal democratic orientation as it is naturally absent at this stage of Afghanistan’s development, a few lovely individuals notwithstanding. First things first. We should get rid of the Islamists and, ideally, restore a modernizing monarchy. Then other good things will follow. Inshallah.

Marek Jan Chodakiewicz is a Professor of History at the Institute of World Politics, A Graduate School of National Security and International Affairs in Washington, DC, where he holds the KoĹ›ciuszko Chair in Polish Studies. Professor Chodakiewicz is author of Intermarium: The Land between the Black and Baltic Seas and teaches a seminar on the history of the Muslim world at Patrick Henry College. He is also a contributor to SFPPR News & Analysis of the Online-Conservative-Journalism Center at the Washington-based Selous Foundation for Public Policy Research.
http://sfppr.org/2017/06/out-of-afghanistan/

Friday, September 22, 2017

The Saudi led coalition need to explore other options in order to defeat the Persian Shiite expansion.



Iranian led terrorists have reached the gates of the Arab Gulf States fortress. Iran has successfully used the Arab against the Arab. It is very difficult for the Arab Gulf State to fight and win Iranian on the Arab land in a military way.

Iran has been benefiting from the religious wars in the Middle East. Iran has managed to unite all non-Sunni population of the Middle East against Saudi Arabia. The Shiite leaders in Tehran claim that the Shiite is the majority sect of Islam in the Arab Gulf State but ruled by Sunni Monarchies.

There is no truth in the Tehran claim. The Shiite are divided in many schools of thoughts. The Iranian brand of Shiite is twelve Imami Shiite and they are majority in Iran but all sects of the Shiite including Ibadi are not near to make up the majority in the Middle East.


Iran has managed to split the Sunni Arab in Palestine. The Shiite regime in Tehran has a very good relation with the brotherhood and a working relationship with Al-Quida and Taliban. Iran has an army in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.
The Shiite regime in Tehran has established many business networks and links with criminal worldwide in order to support their alliances in the Middle East. Iran has built capacities in which it can maintain support to Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite Militia in Iraq, and Syrian regime. Tehran regime think that the Bahrain’s future and part of Saudis stabilities is dependent on Tehran mood.

Mehrab Sarjov wrote in April 2015;
Saudi’s led coalition war against Hothis in Yemen is expensive and it is not sustainable for too long.
Saudis led coalition single warplane cost tens of millions of dollars to bomb a cowshed against Iranian $350. Saudi led coalition has firepower supremacy but Iranian has organisation superiority. The Iranian are waiting for the Saudi led coalition to run out of targets and make mistakes or hit too many wrong targets. Iranian are also waiting for the Saudi led coalition forces to enter Yemen. 

 Iranian led terrorists have reached the gates of the Arab Gulf States fortress. Iran has successfully used the Arab against the Arab. It is very difficult for the Arab Gulf State to fight and win Iranian on the Arab land in a military way.
The Saudi led coalition need to explore other options in order to defeat the Persian Shiite expansion. Iran is a very fragile state. Ideologically Ibadi Hate Shiite, Zaydi Shiite are closer to Sunni than Shiite. The Arab need to win the Arab from Persian Shiite.  
Many will say it is difficult to contain Iran, yes I agree it is difficult but not impossible. It is difficult because Iranian do not follow the international norm. It not impossible because Iran is a poor and low tech state. Iran is fighting so many wars at the same time. Iranian led terrorists have reached the gates of the Arab Gulf States fortress. Iran has successfully used the Arab against the Arab.

The Baluch believe that Tehran Shiite regime is spread too thin all over the Middle East and can be defeated in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Bahrain and in the occupied Baluchistan. We believe that Persian do not have enough resources and man power to maintain so many wars in so many fronts.


Mehrab. Sarjov is, the director for the Campaign for an independent Baluchistan from Iran, Base in London

Sunday, June 25, 2017

We in the Campaign for an independent Baluchistan welcome The Crown prince Mohammad bin Salman comment

The Baluch Relation with the Arab has a long history. Before the occupation of Baluchistan the khante of Baluchistan had close relation with the Al-Saud family. We in the Campaign for an independent Baluchistan welcome the Crown prince Mohammad bin Salman comment that the Crown Prince is recognising Baluchistan as an occupied land and his brave stand against Iranian.
Mehrab. Sarjov, director for an independent Baluchistan from Iran


                                                                                   













The Baluch are not the Persian and Baluchistan is not Iran but an occupied land. In the end of 19th and first quarter of the 20th century the Persian king with the help from European colonisers invaded Baluchistan. The Persian invaded Baluchistan in 1928 and imposed their will on Baluchistan by the force.

Since the invasion of the western Baluchistan in 1928 the Baluch have never given up the dream for an independent Baluchistan and have resisted the Persian occupation.

Iran has been holding the mock presidential and parliamentary elections, in order to turn the Baluch from majority into minority, and reduce the Baluch impact on those fake elections, the Baluch homeland is divided into four administrative units; Sistan and Baluchistan, Khorasan, Kerman, and Hormozgan. The Persian Shiite deprive the Baluch from majority in their own homeland artificially.


Tehran is treating Baluchistan as a Persian colony. The Persian language, culture and religion have been imposed on the Baluch. The education system in Baluchistan exist only for the Persian Shiite settlers in Baluchistan. It does not exist for a common Baluch.    

The discrimination on the basis of religion, language, culture is the Persian’s popular support in Iran.   The total economic differences between the Baluch and Persian are linked to the cultural, linguistic and religious differences. Lack of jobs, discrimination lower standard of living, and frustration shows the high level of the drug addiction among the Baluch. Since the occupation of the Western Baluchistan the Persian did not permit the Baluch to cultivate their culture and improve the Baluchi literature, the Baluch regard this situation as oppressive by the state. 

Iran has become the sources of destabilisation in the region, if it is not contained the Tehran Shiite will swallow the Middle East and they are going to be a challenge to the world order.

It is the time for The Baluch and others nation who have been the victim of the Persian occupation including the Gulf Arab and other who also have been the victim of the Iranian sponsored terrorism to unite against the Persian Shiite expansion.

The Baluch Relation with the Arab has a long history. Before the occupation of Baluchistan the khante of Baluchistan had close relation with the Al-Saud family. We in the Campaign for an independent Baluchistan welcome the Crown prince Mohammad bin Salman comment that the Crown Prince is recognising Baluchistan as an occupied land and his brave stand against Iranian.
Mehrab. Sarjov, director for an independent Baluchistan from Iran,

Wednesday, May 31, 2017

CPEC: the Baloch Perspective


CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) is one segment of the proposed ‘One Belt One Road’ program of the Chinese government aimed at expanding Chinese economic and strategic influence in Asia. It involves a road and rail link from the Baloch town of Gwadar to Western Chinese city of Kashgar. Several special economic zones will be established along the entire length of the Corridor. The Baloch have been expressing their reservations on this project. The majority of the Baloch nationalist consider this as a corridor of death and destruction for the Baloch. This article is an attempt to explain and analyse the Baloch fears regarding CPEC.