A GLIMPSE ON THE
BALOCH NATIONALIM
By Professor Dr.
Taj Mohammad Breseeg
The
20th century has been witness to the rise and
development, of the politics of Baloch identity and nationalism.
Nationalism may be defined in one of two ways – by ethnic or
civic criteria. While ethnic nationalism is based on the
consciousness of a shared identity, culture, belief in common
ancestors and history, civic nationalism is encompassed within a
geographically defined territory. In practice, ethnic
nationalism has had an advantage over territorial or civic
nationalism because the former appears as a natural continuation
of a pre-existing ethnicity. The nationalists believe that their
corporate interests are best protected by possession of their
own state in the international system.
A
community has an identity when its members are able not only to
distinguish it from other communities, but also to convey its
distinctive character in words, gestures, and practices, so as
to reassure them that it should exist and that they have reason
to belong to it. Thus the emergence of a national identity
involves a growing sense among people that they belong naturally
together, that they share common interests, a common history and
a common destiny. To this extent the Baloch have undoubtedly an
obvious claim to national identity, as demonstrated by
perceptible political, economic and social events peculiar to
the Baloch.
Historically,
the period between the 13th century and the end of
the 15th was the most significant in the development
of the Baloch ethno-linguistic community. With respect to this,
the process was just as complex and fundamental. Internally, the
Baloch society moved from the smaller unit of clan to the larger
one of tribe and territorial differentiation. Externally, it
began to assimilate vast segments of other ethnic groups:
Iranians, Indo-Aryans of Punjab and Sindh, Arabs, Pashtuns, etc.
A nation may be divided amongst several states. Such a nation is
a multi-state nation - or, more appropriately, a trans-state
nation. The Baloch today are a trans-state nation. Since the
1920s, their ‘coherence and unity’ have been growing steadily,
and it is directed to the establishment of an independent
“Greater Balochistan”, which
comprises
mainly the Pakistani province of Balochistan, the Iranian
province of Sistan-wa-Balochistan (Sistan and Balochistan), and
the contiguous areas of southern Afghanistan. Thus, as ties of
history, territory and ethnicity maintain a unified Baloch
national identity that spans state frontiers, so does Baloch
nationalism transcend the international boundaries, which cut
across its linguo-ethnic homeland. Therefore, it is important
to place the Baloch national struggle in Eastern Balochistan
(within the state of Pakistan) in the context of the broader
nationalist movement engulfing the Baloch in Iran and
Afghanistan.
Numbering
over 10 million (1981), the Baloch are one of the largest
trans-state nations in southwest Asia. At present, their country
is politically divided into two major parts: eastern Balochistan
with Quetta as its capital has been administered by Pakistan
since 1948; western Balochistan, officially known as
“Sistan-wa-Balochistan” with Zahedan as its capital, has been
under the control of Iran since 1928. The greatest number of
Baloch today still live in Balochistan, though a large Baloch
diaspora has developed in this century, especially in Karachi
and other cities of Sindh, Punjab, Oman, and in recent decades
in the Gulf States as well.
The Baloch people are distinct from the Punjabi and the Persian
elite that dominate Pakistani and Iranian politics - they are
Muslims but more secular in their outlook (in a similar fashion
to the Kurds) with their own distinct language and culture.
However, it is Balochistan’s strategic location, with a long
coastline on the Gulf and its function as one of the gate-ways
from and to Central Asia and Afghanistan, and as the most
important check point of the Gulf’s oil, that has placed it in a
pivotal position in the Subcontinent's, and since the post
colonial years in Pakistan's and Iran’s, history.
Having
its origin in the Balochs’ distinct geography, ecology, culture
and history, Baloch nationalism emerged as an ideology in the
early 1920s. Representing a popular movement against alien
domination, its principal goal is the Baloch national self-rule
in their homeland, an aim sought to preserve their national and
cultural identity, thus advocated and pursued universally by the
Baloch of all classes and social strata.
The
ethnic element (ethnicity) constitutes the salient feature of
Baloch nationalism. The weakness of ethnicity, however, is its
inability to maintain the terminal loyalty of the masses at the
national level. Sub-national rivalry, based on tribal loyalties,
divides the Baloch national movement. These rivalries are then
used by the central governments to weaken the Baloch, in both
Iran and Pakistan. Thus the Baloch movement, in contrast to many
other national liberation movements, has experienced a
persistent contradiction between its traditional leadership and
the relatively developed society it seeks to liberate.
A strong
sense of ethnicity has existed among the Baloch for a very long
time. From the 17th century to the mid-19th century, much of
Balochistan was under the rule of the independent Khanate of
Kalat, and the autonomous Baloch principalities (Western
Balochistan) that produced a flourishing rural and urban life in
the 18th century. Although a people of mixed origin, the Baloch
constitute an ethnicity which has proved its vigour throughout
the ages. They have withstood the inroads of more numerous and
developed peoples such as the Mughals, Turks and Persians, and
despite certain affinities with the latter, they have succeeded
in maintaining their separate identity. Their vitality has been
demonstrated by expansion into non-Baloch regions as well as by
the Balochization of neighbouring people.
The Baloch
may be divided into two major groups. The largest and the most
extensive of these are the Baloch who speak Balochi or any of
its related dialects. This group represents the Baloch “par
excellence”. The second group consists of the various
non-Balochi speaking groups, among them are the Baloch of Sindh
and Punjab and the Brahuis of eastern Balochistan who speak
Sindhi, Seraiki and Brahui respectively. Despite the fact that
the latter group differs linguistically, they believe themselves
to be Baloch, and this belief is not contested by their
Balochi-speaking neighbours. Moreover, many prominent Baloch
leaders have come from this second group. Thus, language plays a
less important role in the Baloch nationalist movement in
Eastern Balochistan, because, as indicated above, language ties
do not unite the whole Baloch community.
Despite the heterogeneous composition of the Baloch, in some
cases attested in traditions preserved by the tribes, they
believe themselves to have a common ancestry. Some scholars have
claimed a Semitic ancestry for the Baloch, a claim which is also
supported by the Baloch genealogy and traditions, and has found
wide acceptance among the Baloch writers. Even though this
belief may not necessarily agree with the facts (which, it
should be pointed out, are very difficult to prove, either way),
it is the concept universally held among members of the group
that matters. In this connection Kurdish nationalism offers a
good parallel. The fact is that there are many common ethnic
factors which have contributed to the formation of the Kurdish
nation; there are also factors which have led to divisions
within the Kurds themselves. While the languages identified as
Kurdish are not the same as the Persian, Arabic, or Turkish,
they are mutually unintelligible. Geographically, the division
between the Kurmanji-speaking areas and the Sorani-speaking
areas correspond with the division between the Sunni and Shiite
schools of Islam. Despite all these factors, the Kurds form one
of the oldest nations in the Middle East. It is interesting to
note that like the Kurdish ruling tribes, various Baloch ruling
tribes have also pretended to an Arab descent and proudly
displayed Arab genealogy – a fact no doubt due to the religious
prestige which attaches to Arab descent among Islamic peoples.
However, even those who have claimed such descent have never
considered themselves anything but Baloch.
The
Balochs’ ethnic background, social organisation, culture,
history, and sense of territoriality are proof of an age-old
Baloch qaum (nation). In many ways, this is a projection
of modern concepts into the past. Nevertheless, the Baloch have
undeniably had a pool of characteristics which encouraged the
development of separate identity well before the 20th
century and gave rise to an assertive ideology of Baloch
nationalism during the national movements of 1920s and onward.
Thus they are united by their belief in common ancestors,
culture, history and Sunni Islam. While there is no one dialect
or language common to all Baloches, the speakers of the various
dialects and languages regard themselves as Baloch and are so
regarded by one another. A unity of tradition and culture
complements this unity of languages. While it is true that
Baloch are divided today between tribesmen (migratory or
sedentary) and urban dwellers, their social mores were formed in
the tribal cauldron.
Of the
various elements that go into the making of the Baloch national
identity, probably the most important is a common social and
economic organisation. For while many racial strains have
contributed to the making of the Baloch people, and while there
are varying degrees of differences in language and dialect among
the various groups, a particular type of social and economic
organisation, comprising what has been described as a “tribal
culture”, is common to them all. This particular tribal culture
is the product of environment, geographical, and historical
forces, which have combined to shape the general configuration
of Baloch life and institutions.
The
above-mentioned characteristics of the Baloch not only unite
them but also separate them from the dominant neighbouring
cultures. This recognition of their ethnic separateness is
reinforced by the separation of the Baloch from the Pakistani
and Iranian national economies. Whether this non-participation
is based on the difference between centre and periphery, urban
vs. rural, industry vs. agriculture, or intentional
discrimination, Balochistan lacks modern factories and modern
industries. It has shared in neither the development of these
countries’ infrastructure nor in the rewards of their economic
development.
The Baloch
history, tradition, culture, language, sense of territoriality
and their common ethnic background form the cohesive bases of
Baloch nationalism, while geography has had both positive and
negative effects on it. Geographical isolation, of course, did
not give rise to nationalism, but there are few factors that
strengthen the nationalism of a people more that the belief that
they are culturally and historically unique in the world. To the
extent that geography was responsible for the uniqueness of the
Baloch character, culture, and history, it helped create a
national particularism, which in turn served as a catalytic
force for the growth of national sentiment in Balochistan.
The same
climatic and geographical conditions that aided the growth of
Baloch nationalism, from another point of view hindered this
growth. As the difficult mountain and desert terrain
historically protected their independence, and made it difficult
for invaders to annex the Baloch territory, on the other hand,
the harsh climate and scarcity of water did not give the Baloch
a chance to emerge as a feudal nation. The harsh climate and the
scarcity of water forced the Baloch to live a nomadic or
semi-nomadic life or to migrate to the Indian subcontinent,
Central Asia, East Africa, or the Arab Middle East.
Balochistan can boast vast gas deposits as well as minerals like
chromium, copper, iron and coal. Gas is found in commercially
viable quantities in Sui and Pirkoh (Pakistan). This is an
important factor in the attitudes of the various Central
governments regarding the question of Baloch self-determination,
and has strengthened the Balochs’ own feeling of being treated
unfairly.
The
historical experiences have played an important role to the
formation of the Baloch national identity. In this connection
the Swiss experience shows a remarkable similarity. In the Swiss
case strength of common historical experience and a common
consensus of aspirations have been sufficient to weld into
nationhood groups without a common linguistic or cultural
background. It should be remembered that the history of the
Baloch people over the past hundred years has been a history of
evolution, from traditional society to a more modern one. (“More
modern” is a comparative term, and does not imply a “modern”
society, i.e. a culminating end-point to the evolution.) As
such, the reliance on tribal criteria is stronger in the earlier
movements, and the reliance on nationalism stronger in the later
ones. Similarly, the organizing elements in the early movements
are the tribes; the political parties gradually replace the
tribes as mass mobilisation is channelled into political
institutions.
The
Baloch constitute a nation distinct from that of the Persians
and Punjabis by every fundamental test of nationhood, firstly
that of a separate historical past in the region at least as
ancient as that of their neighbours, secondly by the fact of
their being a cultural and linguistic entity entirely different
from that of the Persians and Punjabis, with an unsurpassed
classical heritage and a developed language which makes Baloch
fully adequate for all present-day needs and finally by reason
of their territorial habitation of definite areas.
The
growing presence and power of the British East India Company
along the coastal and eastern provinces of India and the
simultaneous disintegration of the Mughal Uzbek and Safavid
empires in India, Central Asia, and Persia respectively, ripened
the conditions for the whole of Balochistan to unite within the
framework of a single feudal state (Kalat State). The rulers of
the mightiest of the khanate accomplished this unification. They
came from the Kambarani or Ahmadzai dynasty (from the founder of
the dynasty-Mir Ahmad who reigned in 1666-1695). However, it was
the sixth Khan of this dynasty, Nasir Khan I, known as the
Great, who drove the frontiers of the Khanate of Kalat northward
into Afghanistan, southward into the Makkoran, westward deep
into Persian territory, and eastward into Punjab and Sindh as
far as Karachi.
The Baloch
destinies, however, changed radically around the time, when the
British and the Persians divided Balochistan into spheres of
influence, agreeing on a border in the mid-19th
century. It should be remembered, up to the British advent, the
Baloch had developed into a major power in the region. They were
ruling not only Balochistan, but also the two richest provinces
of the region, Sindh and Sistan. The British, whose occupation
of the eastern part of Balochistan began in the 1840s, were
interested in Balochistan for military and geopolitical reasons.
In order to protect their colony (India) from the rival
expansionist powers such as Russia, France, and Germany, the
British used Balochistan as a base to protect their interests in
their sphere of influence (Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf
region).
To prevent
Baloch unity and to suppress their nationalist tendencies the
British exploited the Baloch tribal system. Sir Robert Sandeman
advocated a new socio-political system, called the "Sandeman
System" or Sardari Nizam for developing the authority of
the tribal chiefs. In 1854, the Khan of Kalat became a British
protectorate. The treaty of 1876 gave birth to new political
forces in Baloch society, the decline of the powerful feudal
overlord (the Khan) and the rise of a new feudal elite (Sardars).
The Sandeman system granted complete autonomy to the tribal
areas. The status of the Sardar (chief among equals) was
changed into that of a feudal lord and the tribesmen were
declared subjects.
The spread of
the modern doctrines of nationalism among the Baloch, and the
resulting active participation of the Baloch intellectuals in
nationalist activities was in large measure a reaction against
British and Persian supremacy. The First World War and its
aftermath mark an important stage in the growth of Baloch
nationalism. The extent and intensity of nationalist feeling
among the Baloch was profoundly influenced by the impact of the
Russian Revolution, the defeat and break-up of the Ottoman and
the abolition of the Caliphate, the anti-imperialist movements
of the Afghans and the Indians, and the revolutionary ideas set
in motion by these events, as well as by the propagation of the
Wilsonian principles of national self-determination.
Frequent internal
divisions of tribe and social class have marked the development
of Baloch nationalism since its emergence in the 1920s. National
boundaries have also fragmented Baloch nationalist groups and
made it difficult to present a united front to governments.
Governments too have become adept at exploiting Baloch
divisions. Their policies towards Baloch minorities have often
shaped the goals of Baloch nationalist parties - which at
various times have called for cultural and social rights,
autonomy or independence.
The
first apostle of the Baloch national movement was Yusuf Ali
Magasi. In the early 1920s, Magasi and his friends established
the “Anjuman-e Ittehad Balochan” (Organization for the Unity of
Baloch), an underground political organization, for the
liberation of Balochistan. From 1931, the Anjuman with Magasi as
its president started to work openly. Having lived in his youth
in cosmopolitan Lahore (British India), Magasi was familiar with
the anti-imperialist struggle and the material advancement of
modern nations. Magasi’s definition of Baloch nationalism, and
his understanding of who was a Baloch, was based on history,
tradition, bloodline and religion.
Thus
the material with which the early Baloch nationalist leaders
began to build Baloch nationalism was the ethnic characteristics
of the people of Balochistan and the surrounding area. As
discussed in chapter three, the Baloch have a long history,
going back to at least 3000 years. They have creation myths, a
written record, and a body of literary works (primarily oral).
While the Persian and the Punjabi peoples share many of these
earliest cultural markers, there are sufficient differences to
mark the Baloch as a unique people. Being a colonial movement,
the Baloch national movement picked up the language of European
nationalism as early as the 1920s. Thus, concepts such as the
modern nation, identified homeland, and the right of
self-determination, were taken from European ethnic movements.
The Baloch have
consistently resisted all attempts at encroachment upon their
independent status, whether by the British or the Iranian
governments. Their various rebellions in the Eastern and Western
Balochistan, besides being violent manifestations of Baloch
nationalist sentiments, were also waged in defence of the Baloch
way of life. The extension of the external authority of the
British into the Baloch country, accompanied by the new and
unfamiliar economic and technological process of modern
civilization, roused the tribal resistance in the same manner
that it had roused the resistance of the Pashtun tribes in the
mid-19th century, and increased the vehemence of
Baloch nationalism.
It appears
that the British reversed their policy in respect to Balochistan
after the advent of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917.
Thereafter, concerned with containing the spread of the October
Revolution, they assisted Iran to incorporate western
Balochistan in 1928 in order to strengthen the latter country as
a barrier to Soviet expansion southward. The same concern also
led later to the annexation of Eastern Balochistan to Pakistan
in 1948. Henceforth, the Baloch and their homeland were divided
against their will between three states, in order to enable one
great power to enhance its strategic position against another
big power.
Thus, as
indicated above, the superimposed division, in turn, has
provoked the rise of Baloch nationalism and their sense of
irredentism, bringing them into conflict with their respective
states, which are intent on preserving the inherited status quo
from the big powers. It is the superimposition of this division
that has served as the main cause of conflict between the Baloch
and the states in which they were incorporated. Since then, the
Baloch nation, with its distinctive society and culture has had
to confront in both of the “host” states centralizing,
ethnically-based nationalist regimes – the Persians and the
Punjabis – with little or no tolerance for expressions of
national autonomy within their borders.
Following the fall of Mir Dost Mohammad Khan in western
Balochistan in 1928, the aggressiveness of nascent Persian
nationalism gave rise to new grievances and apprehensions, for
besides wounding Baloch national pride; it threatened the Baloch
national identity with extinction. The Pahlavi regime was intent
on building a Western-type secular nation – based on the Persian
national, linguistic and cultural identity. The Baloch response
was a series of revolts throughout the 1930s, led by the tribal
chiefs. However, by the end of 1937, the last of these was
brutally repressed. Thousands of Baloch migrated to eastern
Balochistan and Sindh. It should be noted that, while some of
these revolts were well organised and had well-defined political
aims, others were no more than violent protest against some real
or imagined injustice. Whatever their cause, every fresh
outbreak seemed to fill the cup of Baloch bitterness.
Obviously one of the main reasons for the failure of the early
Baloch revolts was the local, feudal, tribal and patriarchal
characteristics of revolts, which often centred around a local
influential leader, followed by the members of his tribe. Even
the Baranzais in Iranian Balochistan, although well organised at
the higher levels, never penetrated to the broad masses of the
Baloch people. Similarly the major cause of the failure of the
1930s and the 1940s national movements was the lack of a modern
social basis for nation building. The Sardars opposed
modern institutions and reforms. From 1929-1948 there were no
colleges, universities or industries. There existed only the
tribal elite and the oppressed class of nomads and peasants. The
nationalists, mostly of lower middle-class background, were not
in a position to mobilise the Baloch people in the tribal areas
because of the strong control of the chiefs as well as the
opposition of the British. To weaken the tribal chiefs they
looked for help outside the border of Balochistan. They entered
into an alliance with the All India Congress (while the Muslim
League refused support because of its alliance with the Khan and
the Sardars).
In the twentieth century
the formation of new nation-states following World War I and the
partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947, had a profound
impact on Baloch society. Since then, Baloch history has been
dominated by struggles between communities, which became
minorities in new nation-states and national governments which
have sought to divide, to dominate and to suppress their
aspirations. These conflicts have created large population
movements. Many thousands have been forced to leave their homes
and land and many more migrated to escape poverty and
oppression. As discussed in chapter two, the Baloch regions of
Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan have remained among the least
developed in those countries. Tribal ties remain strong in many
areas, and tribal leaders are still influential at local level,
especially in Eastern Balochistan (Pakistan). However,
population movements to the cities and the process of
urbanization in recent decades have created new forms of
political and social organization.
In
1947, the nationalists faced a new situation in the politics of
Balochistan due to the lapse of paramountcy. It is important to
note that the disintegration of the British Empire gave the
Baloch an opportunity to regain their freedom from the British.
Following the end of the War, intense political activities
developed among the Baloch nationalists in Balochistan. They
obtained a parliamentary majority in the elections of 1947. In
1948, while the nationalists were struggling for independence,
the Sardars, made an alliance with the Muslim League. In
return, Jinnah promised to look after their interests. The
reactionary tribal elite could not join the Khan who wanted to
introduce modern institutions instead of protecting the tribal
and feudal system. Thus, the annexation of Balochistan into
Pakistan was a result of the old and dying tribal and feudal
system, represented by the Baloch tribal chiefs. The Anjuman
(1920-1933), and the Kalat State National Party (1937-1948)
represented the Baloch masses opposed the Sardary System.
In March
1948, contrary to the agreement of August 1947, Pakistan
forcefully annexed the Khanate of Kalat. Thus, the Baloch state,
which emerged with the first Baloch confederacy under Mir Jalal
Han in 12th century, came to a tragic end in 1948,
one year after the partition of the Indian subcontinent to India
and Pakistan in 1947. For a brief period (1952-55), however, the
Khanate was given semi-autonomous status as the Balochistan
States Union. But this arrangement collapsed when West Pakistan
was declared a single province in October 1955. In July
1970, Balochistan was restored to separate provincial status,
its boundaries incorporating the former British Balochistan and
the Balochistan States Union.
During the
fifty years of the existence of Pakistan, three wars have been
waged in Balochistan. Agha Abdul Karim’s rebellion was the first
in a series of insurrections against the government of Pakistan.
Under the pressure of the Pakistan government, the Khan of Kalat
declared Agha Abdul Karim and the National Party to be rebels,
on May 24, 1948. Because of its resistance to annexation and its
co-operation with the rebel prince, Agha Abdul Karim, the
Government of Pakistan banned the Kalat National Party in June
1948. On May 26, 1948, Agha Abdul Karim with his rebel group had
entered Afghanistan and set up his headquarters at Mazar
Mohammad Karez in the Shorawak area, in the hope of acquiring
support for a sustained war against Pakistan. But the Afghan
Government did not approve of the presence of the prince and the
National Party in its territory.
Agha Abdul
Karim’s resources were limited and so was his area of
operations. Karim started his movement in the Jhalawan area,
backed by some nationalist leaders and with the secret approval
of the Khan. His rebel followers were not more than 500 to 700.
Due to poor planning and the lack of the expected support from
Afghanistan, the prince and his partisans were forced to
re-enter in Pakistan and surrender. Agha Abdul Karim’s rebellion
was clearly of little immediate importance because it lacked
both unified Baloch political support and Afghan military
support. But what did make it significant in the long run was
the widespread Baloch belief that Pakistan had betrayed the safe
conduct agreement. The Baloch regard this as the first of a
series of “broken treaties” which have created an atmosphere of
distrust over relations with Islamabad. Agha Abdul Karim and his
followers were all sentenced to long prison terms and became
rallying symbols for the Baloch nationalist movement.
The 1950s and
1960s were decades of political upheaval in Pakistan. In
Balochistan tribal structures suffered major setbacks, largely
due to detribalisation and the rise of urban population, and
later to land reforms initiated by the central governments.
Similarly, a visible change occurred in the cultural field. In
the early 1950s, the Baloch press was established. In the
subsequent years of the 1960s and the 1970s many books,
periodicals, and newspapers proudly reported the evidence of the
past. Thus to heighten national consciousness, new avenues were
opened to learn about the past, about present culture, and about
other national phenomena by means of written words. Since then,
by the popularisation of Baloch history, Balochi classical
poetry and the positive characterisation of Baloch personality
and society, the Baloch press has played an important role for
the imagination of the Baloch nation.
Following the
fall of the Khanate, the Baloch leadership accepted the
political reality of Pakistan. As for ideology the “Ustaman Gal”
(People’s Party) marked the first time in Baloch history that
the Baloch stopped asking for outright independence. They
couched their demands in terms of autonomy. The Party, however,
maintained that only elected democratic governments at the
provincial and national levels would guarantee autonomy to the
minority nationalities within the framework of constitutional
provisions.
The
continued existence of military rule in Pakistan from 1958 to
the early 1970s obstructed a democratic solution to the
Balochistan problem and exacerbated inter-regional tension. The
prospect of a democratic political system was lost when the
Pakistan army refused to accept the results of Pakistan’s first
general election in 1970, which led to the dismemberment of the
eastern half of the country, now known as Bangladesh. Moreover,
the sense of betrayal by Bhutto’s civilian regime, which had
signed constitutional guarantees of Balochistan’s autonomous
status, added to the growing nationalist sentiment, which
fuelled the four-year rebellion in the 1970s.
Throughout
the period since the partition, Baloch have had an uncomfortable
relationship with the central government of Pakistan: relations
were poorest in 1973 when they engaged three divisions of the
Pakistan armed forces in a bitter and intense armed struggle. In
1973, the Pakistani security agencies discovered Soviet arms in
the Iraqi Embassy at Islamabad. The government alleged that
these arms were for the liberation movement of Balochistan. The
Baloch nationalists not only denied this allegation, but also
regarded it as a conspiracy by Bhutto and his allies to provide
a cause for military intervention aiming at a take-over in the
province.
However,
despite a new constitution, which guaranteed a degree of
provincial autonomy, in less than a year the Prime Minister of
Pakistan, Zulfikar Bhutto, dismissed the Baloch government on 12th
February 1973. In justifying the dismissal, the centre charged
the provincial government with responsibility for several cases
of lawlessness in Balochistan and alleged its support, in
collusion with foreign governments, for Baloch and Pashtun
separatists. In practice, however, Bhutto acted against the NAP
because, having provincial governments led by a party other than
his own, limited his personal authority, and because of the
pressure from the Shah of Iran.
Thus, in the
1970s, open warfare between the Pakistan military and Baloch
nationalist guerrillas, whose demands ranged from self-rule to
outright independence, racked Balochistan. Guerrilla war went on
for more than four years and came to a stand still in 1977, when
General Zia ul-Haq ousted Bhutto. However, the Baloch movement,
which had come into being in the aftermath of Sardar Ataullah
Mengal’s government, might have lost its ardour, but it did not
die, as claimed by the Pakistani authorities. In fact, a case
can be made that national feelings have grown in potential in
the Baloch society and, given the right circumstances, could
mount an even greater challenge to the Pakistani state. Mir
Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo’s demand for the specific inclusion of the
right of secession for the federating units in the event of
military take over in violation of the constitution indicated a
deep mistrust of the country’s political set-up by the Baloch in
the 1980s.
Though it is true that Baloch
uprisings in 1948-50, 1958-69, and of 1973-1977 were mostly
fought on the inter-tribal basis, but it would be highly
misleading to term these uprisings just confrontation of some
sardars (tribal chiefs) with central government to safeguard
their narrow feudal interests and privileges as some Pakistani
scholars allege.[1]
On the contrary, these uprisings were very reflection of
growing contradiction between the newly built modern centralised
state of Pakistan and a distinctive national group, the Baloch.
The 1973-77 insurgency intensified the
ever-widening gap of distrust and mistrust between the Baloch
and the central government. This mistrust ultimately gave way to
greater demands for a confederation of the four peoples of
Pakistan. The leaders of the sub-nationalities, in self-imposed
exile, formed an organisation, the Sindhi, Baloch, Pakhtun Front
(the SBPF), in April 1985 in London to demand a confederation in
Pakistan. Similarly, the so-called democracy of the 1990s in
Pakistan like that of its military rule led to further
alienation of the Baloch. Speaking on May 2001, in a PTV
(Pakistan TV) programme on provincial autonomy, the former Chief
Minister of Balochistan, Akhtar Mengal blamed the rulers of
Pakistan for suppressing the will of the Baloch people and
violating flagrantly all the previous accord, including the one
made with the Khan of Kalat on August 4, 1947.[2]
By
contrast, in Iranian Balochistan, Reza Shah and subsequently his
son Mohammad Reza adopted an iron-fist policy towards the
Baloch. For the past several decades the Persians have never
hesitated to use their military might against the Baloch to
silence their voice. The official Iranian policy reflects their
determination to suppress any nationalist movement in their
country. It was due to this background that the Baloch national
movement in Iran was less vocal than its counterpart in Pakistan
in the 1960s and 1970s.
The Iranians
used harsh methods to crush Baloch identity. It was forbidden to
wear the traditional Baloch dress in public or to speak Balochi
in schools, and it was a criminal offence to publish,
distribute, or even possess Balochi language books, magazines,
or newspapers. Balochistan was isolated from the outside world
and closed to foreigners. The Iranian policy of destruction of
the Baloch identity, or Persianization of the Baloch under the
Pahlavis may truly be comparable to that of the Turkish
government’s policy against the Kurds under Kemal Ataturk
(1923-38). The Turkish government followed a policy of
systematic extermination and Turcification of the Kurdish people
in the Turkish controlled Kurdistan. Thousands of Kurds were
deported to Western Anatolia, the Kurdish language was
officially banned and Kurdish books were confiscated and burned.
Even the words “Kurd” and “Kurdistan” were to be omitted from
all textbooks. The Kurds were to be called Turks – “mountain
Turks”. Consequently, this policy of Turcification fanned the
Kurdish nationalism furthermore and deepened their separatist
aspirations. As the Turcification of the Kurds in Turkey
provoked the Kurdish nationalism, so did the Persianization
policy of the Iranian authority to the Baloch nationalism in
Iran.
During the
whole Pahlavi era the Persians continued their assimilation and
Persianization policies in western Balochistan. In 1957-9 and
again in 1969-73, the Pahlavi administration used military force
to crush Baloch resistance to its attempts to enforce
assimilation. Subsequently, more subtle 'pacification' methods
were used. Baloch tribal leaders were appointed as
intermediaries and representatives of government interests with
the aim of bridling the economic and social development of
Sistan-wa-Balochistan. In spite of the application of diverse
means of subjugation, the Iranian Baloch maintained a perception
of themselves as a culturally independent qaum (nation).
This was demonstrated by insurgencies against the Khomeini
regime, which initially raised the hopes of the Baloch for
greater provincial autonomy.
The
Shah of Iran gave much importance to the area, which he always
considered very important for the security of his country. Since
Iran had a Baloch minority problem, any uprising in eastern
Balochistan was thought to directly influence Iran. The Iranian
government under the Shah kept a close watch on developments in
the Pakistani part of Balochistan. Iran and Pakistan
collaborated, due to their joint fear of Baloch national
aspirations. It was argued that one of the reasons Pakistan’s
Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto dismissed the nationalist government
in the province was because the Iranian government thought the
Baloch nationalists in eastern Balochistan, might encourage
dissidents in western (Iranian) Balochistan.
With
the collapse of the monarchical regime in 1979, the Baloch began
their political activities openly. The “Sazeman Demokratik”, the
“Ittehad ul-Muslimeen”, the “Zrombesh”, and many other political
and cultural organisations were formed in Balochistan. This
period, however, lasted months, not years. The pattern was
repeated of Baloch nationalist aspirations reappearing whenever
the central government showed weakness. The new regime pursued a
policy of Persian ethnic supremacy toward Balochistan, a
continuation of the policies of the monarchy.
By
comparison, however, like the Baloch political parties in
Eastern Balochistan (Pakistan), the major nationalist
organisations, which came into existence during or after the
Iranian revolution, concentrated their demand on self-autonomy
for Balochistan within Iran. However, the Baloch political life
was short-lived in Iran. In the early 1980s, the clerical regime
ordered the Baloch parties disbanded, to be replaced with
Islamic komitehs (committees) and Revolutionary
Guards controlled by the central government. Ayatollah
Khomeini distrusted the Baloch not least because theirs was a
purely secular agenda. Moreover, he was a Shiite Muslim and the
Baloch were predominantly Sunni. While the Baloch could be
acknowledged as Sunnis, no ethnic or “national” minorities were
recognised in the new constitution of the Islamic Republic.
Since the end
of the Second World War great changes have occurred for the
Baloch throughout Balochistan – gradually at first but
accelerating since 1970 because of the changed political economy
of the Persian Gulf. In Afghanistan major factors affecting the
Baloch have been the Helmand river development schemes, the
government’s Pakhtunistan policy, and the Afghan Revolution in
1978. In Iran the successive Pahlavi governments attempted to
neutralise the Sardars and at the same time suppress any
activity among the Baloch that could lead to ethnic
consciousness or solidarity.
Comparatively, the conditions of the Baloch in Pakistan are
definitely better than those of Iran and Afghanistan. But they
are still far from satisfactory, the Baloch of Pakistan have
consistently fought to improve them economically, culturally and
politically. In Pakistan too the Baloch have suffered much
injustice. Consider, for example, what happened to the Baloch in
the 1973-1977 insurgency. Like their brethren in Pakistan, the
Baloch in Iran also consistently resisted the reactionary
Persian domination and have shown a fervent desire to live under
an independent or autonomous Baloch State as their natural
right.
Since
the early 1970s, the growing modern intelligentsia has been
displacing the traditional intelligentsia, mainly the sardars
and the mollas, in the urban centres. In the 1993
elections, the BNM (Balochistan National Movement) a mainly
middle class party, succeeded in winning two national assembly
and six provincial assembly seats. In the provincial elections
of 1993, the BNM secured over 60 percent from Makkoran.[3]
Another feature of changing social relations is the increasing
access of urban women to education, and their participation in
social, economic, political and cultural life outside their
homes. These transformations left their impact on the
nationalistic movement, expanding its social bases and
increasing political, ideological and organizational tension.
Moreover, the circulation of money
during the Bhutto period, and the fruits of the Gulf syndrome
gave strength to the Baloch middle class whose interest collided
with its more powerful and well-established Pashtun counterpart.
As a result, business sectors such as transport, which were
previously monopolised by the Pashtuns, are now witnessing the
entrance of a rising Baloch middle class. The change of
ownership of some transport businesses like Chiltan Transport
from Pashtun to Baloch hands in 1992 was another testimony of
this fact.[4]
Baloch
nationalism is the antithesis to the politically and
economically dominant and exploitative Iranian (Persian) and
Pakistani (Punjabi) states’ nationalism, a pattern similar to
the rise of the Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East (Iran,
Iraq, and Turkey). In spite of more than 70 years of its
existence, Baloch nationalism has not succeeded in achieving its
goal, the right of self-determination for the Baloch nation. It
is difficult to reach a single plausible explanation, but
judging from the finding of this study, one could cautiously
conclude that by that time due to a dominant tribal social base,
a sense of Balochness had not evolved which was sufficiently
strong to force a different course of events.
Nevertheless,
the Baloch nationalism has steadily developed. Every time, after
being crushed, the national movement arose more forcefully than
before. Comparatively, in 1948, Agha Abdul Karim and his rebel
followers were about 500 to 700. In 1958, Nauruz Khan fought in
a wider area against the Pakistani army and around 1000 to 5000
guerrillas were with him. By July 1963, the guerrilla activities
under the command of Sher Mohammad Marri increased in the
Jhalawan and Marri areas. The fighters had established a score
of camps, where the people were given training in guerrilla
warfare. It was estimated that there were nearly 400 hard-core
hostiles in each area, apart from hundreds of loosely organised
part-time reservists. Meanwhile, the last war (1973-77) involved
more that 55,000 Baloch guerrillas at various stages of the
fighting, and almost every section of the Baloch population was
affected in central and eastern Balochistan by this war. A
similar evolutionary process seems to have happened in Iranian
Balochistan, after the erosion of central authority in Iran
following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, made the prospects
for Baloch nationalism appear more promising in Iran than in
Pakistan.
Though the seeds of Baloch nationalism were sown in Balochistan
in the colonial era, but its full flowering occurred as a result
of centralising policies of the modern post-colonial states of
Pakistan and Iran, which contradicted and restrained the
historical high degree of cultural and political autonomy of
Baloch populace. To a large extent the sporadic Baloch uprisings
in Pakistan helped in forging a political consciousness amongst
general Baloch populace; based on common ethnic, cultural and
historical ties transcending tribal loyalties.
The Cold War,
however, led indirectly to the weakening of the Baloch national
movements both in Iran and Pakistan. Because both the countries
were to be America’s allies against Soviet expansion in the Gulf
region, the United States was prepared to support them in
furthering her own foreign policy initiatives. Since the West
supported Tehran and Islamabad, so the Baloch turned to Baghdad
and Kabul. Thus the U.S. policies indirectly helped to
strengthen the two countries in their attempts to suppress the
Baloch movement for self-rule during the whole Cold War period.
In this regard, the Iranians’ use of the U.S. supplied arms
against the Baloch movement in 1973-77 is the most striking
example.
The political situation of Baloch
today reflects two contradictory tendencies. As the old warrior
Sher Mohammad Marri in the early 1990s stated, “Baloch
nationalism has penetrated the masses and is not confined to the
Nawabs and Sardars alone”.[5]
The urbanization, detribalisation and the migration of the
Baloch people to the cities of the region, have contributed to
the development of mass national consciousness. Yet their
political leaderships have often fallen prey to internal
divisions on both ideological and tribal lines. Divisions
between the Balochs’ political parties started with Zia’s
party-less elections in 1985, and later it sharpened during the
so-called 1990s democracy. The regional aspect of the Baloch
issue, as well as the growing complexities of Baloch society
have greatly complicated the task of the Baloch national
movement in achieving unity and a coherent strategy to achieve
their goals.
The material
analysed above warrants the conclusion that the Baloch form a
distinct nation and that their national consciousness is strong
enough to consider their national movement as having deep roots
in the convictions and aspirations of that nation. The divisive
factor of tribal loyalties will tend to play a constantly
diminishing role because of the impact of modern civilization,
which is changing the cultural patterns in the whole southwest
Asia. The paper also attempted to connect the Baloch problem
with the past policies not only of the Baloch inhabited states
but also of the Great Powers in an effort to demonstrate that no
Great Power interested in the region can afford to ignore the
Baloch problem or avoid the formulation of a Baloch policy as
part of an over-all Southwest Asian policy.
[1]
See Ahmed, Aijaz. 1992. ‘The national question in
Baluchistan’, in S. Akbar Zaidi (ed.) Regional
Imbalances, p. 214 ;Ahmed, Feroz. 1974. Ethnicity and
Politics in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University
Press., p.175; see also White Paper on Baluchistan.
1974. p. 39.
[2]
Daily Balochistan Express, Sunday, 6 May 2001.
[3]
Nek Buzdar, “Social Organization, Resource use, and
Economic Development in Balochistan” in: Monthly
Balochi Labzank, Hub (Balochistan), March-April
2000, p. 76.
[4]
Abbas Jalbani, “Can Balochistan Survive?” in: The
Herald, March 1992.
[5]
The News International, 3-9 July 1992.
No comments:
Post a Comment